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ABSTRACT 
Changing the Role of Appraisal and Interpersonal Factors in 
Guilt Induction: Time, Perspective, and Responsibility 
by 
Chris Lee Treadwell, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 2001 
Major Professor: Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson 
Department: Psychology 
Appraisal theories of emotion assert that guilt arises from the evaluations one 
ill 
makes about one's behavior. Perpetrators experience guilt when they view themselves as 
responsible for harm caused to their victims. Interpersonal theories of emotion hold that 
guilt is a function of relational factors , including the need to repair relationships . Theorists 
argue that guilty feelings often arise in spite of appraisals, and that perpetrators feel guilty 
because of a need to communicate reconciliatory messages to their victims. These two 
views of guilt are generally seen as mutually exclusive. This study proposed integrating 
both views of guilt into a single, interactive theory of guilt that includes both appraisals 
and interpersonal concerns and that asserts that guilt varies as a function of the appraisals 
one makes about one's own and others' behavior, the nature of the relationship between 
perpetrators and victims, the perspective from which one views events, and the passage of 
time. The main question asked was: when taking into account these factors, is guilt better 
accounted for by an appraisal , interpersonal , or the newly proposed integrative view of 
guilt? 
IV 
One-hundred forty-seven male and 168 female university students were presented 
with scenarios depicting the interaction of two people who were friends or enemies and 
were directed to adopt the perspective of perpetrators, victims, or were not given 
instructions to adopt a perspective. In each scenario, a perpetrator acted to inflict harm 
that was either unintentional or angrily intended . Participants then rated perpetrators ' 
responsibility appraisals, emotional responses, and forgiveness needs . Additionally, 
participants were asked to rate how responsible perpetrators believed their victims 
believed them to be. 
Correlational analyses and AN OVA were used to test the effects of the factors in 
the proposed model on ratings of guilt. Although partial support was found for both the 
appraisal view and the interpersonal view of guilt, results provided the strongest support 
for the interactive view of guilt. Discussion focused on the role of appraisals , relational 
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STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Over the past several decades, researchers have generally concluded that guilt 
results when an individual appraises the self as personally responsible for a misdeed or 
negative event ( e.g., de Rivera, 1984; Heider, 1958; Izard , 1977; Shaver, 1985; Smith & 
Ellsworth , 1985; Weiner, 1986, 1995; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). These models 
are based, in part , on Heider's (1958) classic analysis oflevels or types ofresponsibility. 
Heider asserted that personal and environmental forces combine to form different 
perceptions of responsibility. According to his formulation, three key factors in 
distinguishing levels of responsibility are the degree to which a negative outcome is 
appraised as avoidable versus unavoidable , intentional versus unintentional, and as justified 
or unjustified. Appraisal-based theories of emotions generally assert that any given 
emotion is the result of a unique pattern of cognitive evaluations that are based on several 
dimensions of appraisal. Although various appraisal theorists have argued for slightly 
different sets of appraisal dimensions as causative of different emotions ( e.g. , Frijda, 1986; 
Lazarus , 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer , 1988), all appraisal theories acknowledge an 
appraisal dimension equivalent to , or analogous to, responsibility . For example, Roseman 
(1984) and Frijda (1986) have both referred to a causal dimension of agency. Scherer's 
( 1988, 1997) theory refers to dimensions of fairness and agency that he suggests lead to 
identification of the responsible agent. Lazarus ( 1991) included in his theory the appraisal 
dimension of accountability that leads to blameworthiness. In each of the theories cited, 
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guilty feelings result from the individual's determination that he or she is responsible for 
some untoward act or event (in addition to other appraisals). The essential point is that , 
although different appraisal theories diverge in the language used to describe the appraisal 
dimensions , most appraisal theorists generally concur that responsibility plays a large role 
in eliciting guilty feelings . 
The predictions made by appraisal theorists regarding a wide range of emotions are 
supported by empirical findings demonstrating that individuals will report emotions that 
are consistent with the unique pattern of appraisals they have made . Appraisal theorists 
have not been without their crit ics, however. These critics argue that appraisal theorists 
treat emotions as largely intrapsychic processes that occur because of the emotional 
individual ' s own private appraisals , without being directly influenced by factors outside 
the individual experiencing the emotion. 
Recent interpersonal views of emotion, including that espoused by Brian Parkinson 
( 1995 , 1997) , assert instead that emotions are fundamentally social rather than 
intrapsychic in origin. In Parkinson's view , emotions arise out of social exchanges because 
they serve to convey how an individual wishes to be viewed or treated by others. An 
individual thus becomes emotional as a means of staking a claim about his or her identity. 
Parkinson argued that as individuals experience dissonance between how they view 
themselves and how they perceive others view them, they assert their identity claims by 
becoming emotional. In Parkinson's view , people feel guilty as a means of asserting the 
identity claim that they wish to be forgiven ; alternatively , their angry feelings stake the 
claim that they deserve to be treated differently . It should be emphasized that Parkinson 
did not deny the existence of the private appraisals emphasized and studied so widely in 
the field of emotions. Parkinson simply questioned their necessary causative role in 
eliciting emotions. Parkinson explicitly asserted that appraisals are simply a language that 
individuals use to organize, describe, and make sense of emotions once aroused. 
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Parkinson's assertions about the role of identity claims in emotion elicitation have 
not been tested empirically. But, recent evidence does suggest that emotions (e.g., guilt) 
arise in the absence of the types of appraisals that the appraisal theorists claim are so 
central to arousing them. In particular, it has been found that people actually report feeling 
guiltier when they perpetrate an untoward event for which they feel little or no 
responsibility compared to cases in which they believe themselves to be highly responsible 
( e.g., Ferguson , Olthof , & Stegge, 1997; Kroon, 1988). These findings appear to directly 
contradict appraisal accounts of guilt elicitation . Interpersonal theorists who focus 
specifically on the emotion of guilt ( e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994) 
contend that these findings are evidence of the role of interpersonal factors, rather than 
private appraisals, in eliciting this painful emotion. One might be tempted to conclude that 
appraisal and interpersonal theories of emotion (including guilt) are therefore 
incompatible. However , recent evidence suggests that it may be possible to accommodate 
an interpersonal perspective within the traditional appraisal view of guilt by considering 
three important factors that can impact this emotion (as well as other emotions). 
First, in any emotion-inducing event, one may view the event from multiple 
perspectives. For example, one might view the interaction between a perpetrator and a 
victim from either the perpetrator 's point of view (which is typical of traditional appraisal 
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theories) or from that of the victim (more characteristic of the interpersonalists). Second, 
instead of viewing emotions as static phenomena, they might be better viewed as dynamic 
processes that occur, and can change, over time. It is feasible that a perpetrator's private 
appraisals of responsibility are the primary motivators of guilt at one moment in time 
(which is consistent with the traditional appraisal view of this emotion) , but that the 
victim's actual or perceived appraisal of responsibility governs the guilt response at other 
points in time (which is consistent with the interpersonalists' accounts of guilt). And third, 
the relationship between perpetrator and victim-a central variable in all interpersonal 
theories of emotion--will affect the likelihood of the perpetrator ever viewing the event 
from the victim's perspective . 
In considering these three factors together , it may well be that the perpetrator's 
own immediate appraisal of his or her responsibility for an event (self-directed appraisal) 
interacts with the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and victim to 
determine the degree to which the perpetrator relies upon his or her own appraisals versus 
those of the victim. In turn, the degree to which the perpetrator attends to the victim's 
appraisals will determine the perpetrator's communicative agenda (identity claims) and the 
initial emotion elicited . Specifically , it is possible that perpetrators ' initial emotional 
self-reports are influenced by their own personal appraisal of the situation when they 
perceive their behavior as having proper justification ( even if this disagrees with the 
victim ' s potential perspective on the event). The latter is especially likely to occur when 
the relationship between the perpetrator and victim is an enemic rather than friendly one. 
Similarly, it is possible that perpetrators' initial identity claims are governed more by their 
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own personal appraisal of the situation when they perceive their behavior as having proper 
justification, again especially in adversarial rather than close, caring relationships . It is also 
possible that with the passage of time, the nature of the relationship between the 
perpetrator and the victim will lead to a shift in perspective whereby the perpetrator 
assumes a different perspective from that initially taken ( e.g., the perpetrator begins to 
attend to the victim's appraisals) . This change in perspective thus leads to a need to strike 
a different identity claim about the relationship , thereby leading to a change in the 
emotional response. 
This line ofreasoning is consistent with Parkinson's (1995) views on appraisals, 
that it is the victim's appraisals of the perpetrator's responsibility, rather than the 
perpetrator 's appraisals of his or her responsibility , that underlie guilty feelings. Viewed in 
this way, it may be possible to explain the conflicting findings with respect to the role of 
appraisals in arousing feelings of guilt by considering that interpersonal factors , like those 
posited by Parkinson, often interact with exclusively self-derived appraisals to determine 
the perspective adopted , the interpersonal claims struck, and the resulting emotions 
experienced. The precise nature of this interaction also likely changes with the passage of 
time. It is important , therefore , to investigate how interpersonal factors and appraisals of 
responsibility affect the elicitation of guilt across time and to test the possibility that both 
interpersonal and traditional appraisal theories may actually be valid, depending on when 
emotions are measured during the unfolding emotional process and also depending upon 
whether appraisals are measured from the perspective of the perpetrator or the victims. 
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The general problem addressed in this dissertation can therefore be summarized as 
follows: When taking into account time, the nature of relationship between individuals, 
and perspective , are feelings of guilt better accounted for by traditional appraisal 
explanations of emotion (that emphasize cognitive evaluations entertained largely from 
one ' s own perspective) , by an interpersonal theory that emphasizes the communicative 
function of emotions (i.e., identity claims) and that stresses one's tendency to adopt 
outside agents ' perspectives , or by an integrated theory that recognizes the importance of 
both self-directed appraisals as well as interpersonal factors (including other-directed 
appraisals) in emotional arousal? 
This problem was investigated by addres sing several component questions: (a) to 
what extent do appraisals (including those related to responsibility) made by a perpetrator 
versus those made by the victim substantially affect the emotions experienced by the 
perpetrator? (b) to what degree are the identity claims communicated by a perpetrator 
driven by the perpetrator ' s self-perceptions and motives versus the victim's perceptions or 
motives? and (c) to what extent do the victim' s perceptions govern the perpetrator's 
emotions and his or her identity claims relatively early in the unfolding emotion process? It 
will be argued that even in very close, caring relationships , a perpetrator is unlikely to 
initially adopt the victim' s perspective when the perpetrator believes that she or he was 
justified in harming the victim. That in these close, caring relationships, a perpetrator is 
more likely to adopt the victim's perspective later in time even when the perpetrator 
initially felt justified for harming the victim. That in close, caring relationships , a 
perpetrator is more likely to initially adopt the victim's perspective when the perpetrator 
believes that she or he was not justified in harming the victim. And that in more 
adversarial relationships , a perpetrator is unlikely to adopt the victim's perspective either 
earlier or later in time. 
The investigation consisted of presenting participants with scenarios that depicted 
a harmful interaction between two people who were either friends or enemies. In addition 
to manipulating the nature of the relationship, characteristics of the harmful event were 
varied such that the harmdoer ' s behavior could be seen as having proper initial 
justification or not in the Heiderian sense. In one scenario, the harm occurred 
unintentionally but nonetheless could have been avoided , thus representing Heider ' s 
"foreseeable" level of responsibiljty, and therefore occurring without proper justificat ion 
from the perpetrator ' s initial perspective. In a second scenario, the harm occurred 
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because of "angry intent," thus representing Heider 's 'justified " level ofresponsibilit y at 
least from the perpetrator 's initial perspective. Scenarios were presented with instructions 
that directed participants to attend to either the perpetrator ' s or the victim' s perspective of 
the events portrayed , or no instructions were provided regarding the perspective to be 
adopted. Participants ' perceptions of the identity claims struck , the relevant appraisals 
made from the selfs and others ' perspectives , and the emotions experienced were 
assessed at two time points (immediately after the emotion-relevant event and one day 
later) . Analyses focused on how the degree of perceived guilt changed as a result of 
changes in the perspective taken on the event, which was beljeved to be impacted the most 
by the direct manipulation of perspective, the nature of relationship manipulation, and the 
time at which guilt was measured. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Traditional appraisal theories of emotion argue that the persons experiencing 
various emotions do so because of the different ways in which they have privately or 
intrapsychically evaluated the event. The first purpose of the literature review is to 
summarize traditional appraisal-based theories of the elicitation of guilt. Recently, 
however , these traditional appraisal theories of emotion generally (and guilt, more 
specifically) have been criticized by those who argue for a more interpersonal view of 
emotion elicitation. Private , intrapsychic appraisal theories of guilt have been fervently 
attacked by Brian Parkinson (1995 , 1997). The second purpose of this review is to 
summarize Parkinson ' s most pivotal reservations about appraisal theory and to elucidate 
his (and others') views of how interpersonal factors are involved in guilt elicitation. The 
third purpose of the literature review is to profile, if only briefly, some of the actual 
empirical evidence that supports traditional appraisal theories of guilt as opposed to 
evidence that better supports Parkinson's (and others') interpersonal theories of guilt 
arousal. In this third section, brief attention is paid to the empirical research that appears 
overwhelmingly supportive of appraisal theorists' views of guilt arousal. The third section 
includes, as well, an overview of the type of evidence that supports or is needed to 
support Parkinson's newer and more revolutionary perspective on guilt induction. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the some of the factors that need to be examined in 
8 
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order to discern the extent to which traditional appraisal and/or newer interpersonal views 
are valid explanations of guilt arousal. These factors are the perspective taken on the 
event, the time at which guilt is measured, the relationship between the person in whom 
the emotion is induced and the object of that emotion, and the emotional individuals' 
responsibility for the events in question. These four factors are then used to suggest a 
possible design for teasing apart the validity of appraisal versus interpersonal views of 
guilt arousal. Predictions based on this design are then outlined for the reader. 
Traditional Appraisal Views of Guilt Induction 
Underpinnings of Appraisal Views of Guilt 
Guilt is widely believed to be associated with self-perceptions of blameworthiness 
(e.g., de Rivera, 1984; Izard , 1977; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Wicker et al., 1983). The 
notion of blameworthiness stems from a tradition that evolved from theories concerning 
perceptions ofresponsibility. The social psychologist Fritz Heider first hypothesized that 
people's perceptions ofresponsibility reflect the interplay of personal and situational 
factors that combine to represent progressively greater degrees ofresponsibility. Heider's 
( 1958) analysis includes five levels of responsibility: association , commission, 
foreseeability, intentionality, and justifiability. According to Heider's formulation, the 
lowest degree of responsibility is ascribed to an individual when he or she is merely 
associated with a negative outcome. Responsibility increases when the negative outcome 
is perceived to be the direct result of the individual's behavior (i.e., the behavior caused 
the outcome in question, but was nonetheless unintended and uncontrollable or 
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unavoidable). The perception ofresponsibility further increases when the individual's 
behavior that caused the negative outcome is thought to have been foreseeable (i.e., was 
unintended but avoidable or controllable), such as when someone acted carelessly or 
negligently. When the individual's behavior that caused the negative outcome is believed 
to have been intentional and controllable/avoidable, perceptions of responsibility increase 
even further. An evaluation that the individual's outcome-related behavior was avoidable, 
intentional and unjustified leads to an even greater perception of responsibility. Finally, a 
belief that the outcome-related act-even if it were intended and controllable or 
avoidable-was justified serves to mitigate the perception ofresponsibility. Reider's 
model is supported by empirical studies that have demonstrated that adults can make 
responsibility attributions in accordance with it (for a review, see Fincham & Jaspars, 
1980). 
Traditional Appraisal Approaches to Guilt 
Heider's influential treatise has contributed to a variety of theories that assert that 
emotion arises as a result of individuals' subjective evaluation of an antecedent situation or 
event , including his or her responsibility for it ( e.g., Arnold, 1960; Conway & Bekerian, 
1987; Dalkvist & Rollenhagen, 1987; de Rivera, 1977; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1968, 1991; 
Mees, 1985; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony , Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 
1984, 1991; Scherer, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Solomon, 
1976; Weiner, 1982, 1986). Arnold (1960) first posited that it is not the cold hard facts of 
a situation that lie at the heart of emotions. She suggested that something other than 
11 
objective perceptions account for emotional responses and concluded that the personal 
relevance of the event contributes to its emotional impact. Smith and Lazarus (1993) 
referred to this as the distinction between the knowledge one has about an event versus the 
evaluation one makes of that knowledge with respect to its personal significance. 
According to Scherer (1999) , appraisal theorists hold that "emotions are elicited and 
differentiated on the basis of a person ' s subjective evaluation or appraisal of the personal 
significance of a situation , object , or event on a number of dimensions or criteria" 
(p. 637) . 
An important cornerstone of appraisal theories of emotion is the belief that it is the 
appraisals themselves that are causative of emotion. For example, Lazarus (1991 ), a major 
advocate of the appraisal approach to emotion , sees various dimensions of appraisal as 
having a direct causal impact on emotion. In Lazarus ' view, we become angry because we 
perceive a person as blameworthy for infringing upon another ' s rightful due ; we become 
afraid because we appraise the situation as dangerous ; the feeling of guilt emerges out of a 
self-appraisal of blameworthiness for violating standards of conduct , and so forth. 
Appraisal theorists assert that each emotion (e.g. , guilt versus anger) is caused by a 
different pattern of appraisals. Each theorist has argued for the involvement of slightly 
different appraisal dimensions in guilt. For example, Roseman (1984 , 1991) asserted that 
guilt results when one appraises a situation as motive-inconsistent , perceives the self as the 
causal agent , and concludes that the self is operating from a position of weakness. Lazarus 
( 1991) described an appraisal process in which guilt is the natural outcome of evaluations 
of goal relevance and goal incongruence, in which the involvement of the self is to manage 
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a moral transgression, and in which blame is directed at the self Scherer ( 1988) sees guilt 
arising from a similar, yet also somewhat different, set of appraisals. His theory 
emphasizes that guilt arises when there is an appraisal of goal hindrance, when causation is 
seen as internal, and when there is a perception that one has transgressed the standards of 
one's social group. 
Although these theories and others ( e.g., Frijda, 1986; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) 
define the appraisal components of guilt somewhat differently, they agree that guilt is 
elicited by some form of responsibility appraisal. Thus, according to appraisal theorists, 
when Sarah arrives home late from work one day and realizes she has forgotten her 
daughter's dance recital, she appraises the situation in terms of various dimensions (e.g., 
goal/motive incongruence, agency, compatibility with standards, controllability), including 
responsibility, and experiences guilt only to the extent that she perceives herself to be 
responsible for the situation. The essential message is that appraisal theorists see a direct 
causal relationship between self perceptions of responsibility and guilt, much as Heider 
(1958) described. 
Parkinson's Interpersonal Views of Guilt Induction 
In his interpersonal model of emotion, Parkinson ( 1995, 1997) is critical of many 
long-standing views of emotion in psychology. His criticisms strike a familiar chord with 
sociologists' accounts of emotion (e.g., Gordon, 1974; Kemper, 1978; Sarbin, 1986; 
Scheff, 1988, 1990, 1997; Shotter, 1993; Thoits, 1989) as well as psychological accounts 
that are firmly rooted in sociology ( e.g., de Rivera, 1984, 1992; de Rivera & Grinkis, 
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1986). Parkinson ( 1995) asserted that traditionally accepted psychological theories of 
emotion are misguided in several specific respects-all of which revolve around views that 
emotions are intrapsychic in nature (cf Baumeister et al., 1994). The term "intrapsychic" 
is rife with multiple meanings from the interpersonalists' views. For purposes of the 
present proposal, which focuses on guilt, suffice it to note that the interpersonalists take 
major issue with the notion that guilt arises largely out of the emotional individual's own 
private appraisals that they are or are not responsible for a misdeed. 
Major Assertions by Parkinson 
Parkinson's primary contention is that emotion is a fundamentally social or 
communicative process through which people express (if only in their imagination) identity 
claims to others and themselves. Expressions of anger , for example, can stake various 
identity claims. They often communicate that one's rights have been infringed upon 
("you've offended me") or they are assertions of one's rights ("respect me"). But , anger 
expression can also convey negative self-attitudes (e.g., "How could I be so stupid!") or 
communicate one's loss of control in a situation that merits apologies or excuses for 
untoward behavior ("forgive me"). In Parkinson's view, then, emotions serve the critical 
function of conveying information about the social roles to which we do and do not 
assent. Parkinson thus reconceptualizes the quality of emotion in terms of relational 
variables ( e.g., conferring status or respect; desiring intimacy or friendship, cf Kemper, 
1978) and the constant readjustments that these relationships entail. Parkinson (1995) 
stated that "emotion is something that only makes complete sense when looked at in the 
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context of the encounter within which it arose .... Thus , in order to understand the 
phenomenon , it is necessary to consider the nature of the relationships that surround it" 
(pp. 190-191) . In his view, emotions exist as a means of communicating one's view of 
oneself and how others should treat the self Emotions are not internal processes but a 
means of presenting oneself in a certain way to a specific audience (real or perceived) to 
get them to treat us differently. 
Inherent in Parkinson's (1995 , 1997) claims about the communicative function of emotion 
is an acknowledgment of the dynamic nature of emotions. He explained his view: 
Emotions are not private messages that pre-exist their transmission into the 
social world. Rather, emotions arise in the evolving context of 
communicative interaction. Furthermore, it is not necessarily emotion per 
se that is communicated when we pick up information from other people's 
verbal and nonverbal behavior. Rather we coordinate ourselves to what 
they do and somewhere along the line emotion occurs between us. 
(p. 182) 
Parkinson (1995 , 1997) thus argued that emotion research must take into account the 
unfolding process of emotions across time although , in fairness to appraisal theorists , it 
should also be noted that they, too , emphasize that emotions are best viewed as processes 
rather than as static phenomena. For example, the prominent appraisal theorist Scherer 
( 1999) criticized researchers for failing to study "continuously occurring changes in the 
underlying appraisal and reaction processes" (p. 648) in evolving emotion episodes. These 
positions echo other descriptions of emotion as dynamic systems ( e.g., Fogel et al., 1992; 
Gottman, 1979; Lazarus, 1991). 
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Role of Appraisal 
Parkinson takes issue with appraisal views of emotion that argue that appraisals 
are necessary and sufficient causes of emotion ( e.g., that we become angry because we 
perceive a person as blameworthy for infringing upon another's rights or we become 
afraid because we appraise the situation as dangerous or that we feel guilty because we 
perceive ourselves as responsible for a misdeed). Parkinson (1997) argues that empirical 
support for the causal status of appraisal in arousing different emotions is weak (at best). 
Specifically, he argues that much of the implied support for appraisal-emotion links stems 
from self-report methodology that requires participants to make appraisals. Parkinson 
argues that finding appraisals using this methodology supports a conceptual connection 
between appraisals and emotion but provides little understanding of the potential causal 
relationship that may exist. 
In addition to his criticisms of the research literature, Parkinson has provided 
theoretically grounded reasons for doubting appraisal's necessary causal role in inducing 
emotion. He asserted that "the expression of emotion in any real-life context does not 
necessarily follow a process of appraisal, rather it stakes a claim about how the situation 
should be appraised" ( 1995, p. 191, emphasis added). Stated differently: People do not 
become angry because they perceive someone's injurious behavior towards them as 
actually controllable. Their anger stems more from a perception that the behavior should 
have been controlled (regardless of whether it actually is perceived as controllable) and 
their desire to strike this particular identity claim. 
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In Parkinson's model, the type of identity claim communicated in any given 
situation is affected greatly by the nature of the relationship between the parties involved 
in the interaction. For example, after a lunch date, Tom may not actually hold himself 
responsible for his girlfriend being late for class, yet he may nonetheless adopt the 
emotional attitude of guilt if he perceives it as the appropriate strategy to protect the 
relationship. Thus, in Parkinson's view, the individual's privately held appraisals of 
responsibility are not what generates the emotional display of guilt. The display, instead, is 
motivated by relational goals, which are expressed through identity claims. 
Of course, Parkinson could be understood as saying that any form of appraisal is 
unnecessary to account for emotions. This understanding misrepresents his view, however. 
In Parkinson's (1995) account, emotions exist to communicate a message about the 
appraisals that the person expects or wants others to make about the situation. Parkinson 
himself states that "my argument is that these themes [appraisals] characterize what the 
person getting emotional is communicating to the target of the emotional action, or rather 
what effect the emotional display is intended to have on its specified audience" (p. 285). In 
other words, appraisals simply contribute to the content of the messages communicated by 
emotions and are not the cause of emotions. Expression of emotion arises from a need to 
communicate a specific, interpersonal message. 
Application of Parkinson's Theory 
Having considered Parkinson's (1995, 1997) views on the interpersonal nature of 
emotion in general terms, the focus now shifts to Parkinson's perspective on the emotion 
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of guilt. In this view guilt, like all emotions, serves an interpersonal function. Whereas the 
appraisal approaches to emotion see guilt as the consequence of privately held perceptions 
of personal responsibility concerning some transgression, Parkinson (1995) holds that guilt 
is simply a "communicative act directed to the person who has suffered harm, asking for 
forgiveness from them" (p. 296). For example, a person who is the object of another's 
disapproval will experience guilt only to the extent he or she wishes to communicate an 
appeal for absolution. However, if the person does not seek forgiveness (i.e., he or she 
does not wish to communicate an identity claim of "forgive me"), the person does not 
experience guilt. Moreover, if the person interprets the others' behavior as "angry," then 
s/he may wish to communicate a very different identity claim such as "respect me," and he 
or she will necessarily experience anger as the strategy for communicating this identity 
claim. 
The essential point from the aforementioned example of guilt in the context of 
others' reactions is that people's emotional response are not necessarily or always a 
function of the private appraisals they have made about their own behavior. Rather, 
emotions arise from the need to communicate identity claims and these identity claims may 
well conflict with private appraisals . Parkinson (1995) holds that the precise identity claim 
to be communicated is a function of nature of the relationship between individuals. In 
addition, emotions may indeed express the appraisals as predicted by appraisal theorists, 
but from the interpersonal vantage point, the presence of appraisals serves only to 
reinforce ex-post facto the identity claim rather than causing them in the first place. As 
such, it is the very characteristics of the interpersonal relationship that determine (a) the 
identity claims to be communicated , (b) the appraisals made, ( c) the emotions that are 
experienced , and (d) the intensity of the emotional experience. 
Empirical Support for Appraisal and Interpersonal Views of Guilt 
Appraisal Theories of Guilt 
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Many empirical studies have investigated the relationship between appraisals and 
emotions (see Lazarus , 1991, Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Manstead & Tetlock , 1989; 
Parkinson , 1995; Parkinson & Manstead , 1992; Reisenzein & Hoffman, 1993; Roseman, 
Spindel, & Jose , 1990; Scherer , 1988, 1999 for reviews). Research paradigms have 
included inviting participants to recall emotional experience s and questioning them about 
antecedent evaluations (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Folkman & Lazarus , 1988; Frijda, 
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Gehm & Scherer , 1988; Mauro , Sato , & Tucker , 1992; 
Reisenzein & Hoffinan, 1993; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Smith & Ellsworth , 1985; 
Tesser , 1990); relying on naturally emotion -laden events or inducing emotions 
experimentally and measuring appraisal judgments (Folkman & Lazarus , 1985; Smith, 
1989; Smith & Ellsworth , 1987; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997); asking participants to report 
their anticipated emotional responses to vignettes that have been manipulated with respect 
to appraisal-relevant dimensions (McGraw, 1987; Roseman , 1984; Russell & McAuley, 
1986; Smith & Lazarus , 1993; Stipek, Weiner, & Li, 1989; Weiner, Amirkhan , Folkes, & 
Verette , 1987; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler , 1982; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979); 
and by presenting emotion words and asking participants to evaluate their appraisal 
implications (Conway & Bekerian, 1987; Frijda, 1987; Parkinson & Lea, 1991: 
Smolenaars & Schutzelaars, 1986/87). 
In terms of guilt, researchers have found support for appraisal views of this 
emotion (Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1991; Roseman, Antoniou , & Jose, 
1996; Roseman et al., 1990; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Scherer, 1997; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993; Weiner, 1985). For 
example , Smith and Lazarus (1993) presented participants with scenarios that depicted 
harmful events ( e.g. a friend betraying a confidence, a student being persecuted by a 
teaching assistant, a favorite relative contracting cancer , and students performing poorly 
on an important test). Scenarios were presented in two stages. During the first stage, 
participants were provided with details to evoke appraisals of either other-blame or 
loss/helplessness. In the second stage , participants in both the other-blame and the 
loss/helpless condition at Stage 1 were provided with additional information designed to 
evoke appraisals of other-blame, self-blame, threat, or loss/helplessness . At the end of 
both stages , participants rated their appraisals and emotions. Consistent with appraisal 
views of guilt, results indicated that guilt was rated low in the other-blame and 
Joss/helplessness conditions of Stage 1. With the introduction of the self-blame 
manipulation at Stage 2, ratings of guilt and self-accountability increased to significantly 
higher levels. 
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A study by McGraw (1987) also exemplifies research conducted to investigate the 
appraisal antecedents of guilt. McGraw developed scenarios or had participants generate 
their own scenarios in which a perpetrator harmed a victim and which were meant to 
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reflect Heider's (1958) levels ofresponsibility . Participants were requested to identify with 
either the harmdoer or the victim, or to read and respond to each scenario as an objective 
outside observer. Participants rated their attributions concerning the justification , 
intentionality, and overall responsibility of the harmdoer's behavior, as well as harmdoer 
guilt and victim distress . Results showed that participants attributed increasing levels of 
responsibility to the harmdoer through the Heiderian levels of unforeseeable, foreseeable , 
and unjustified harm, with a decrease in perceived responsibility when the act was 
justified. In addition, as predicted by appraisal theories of emotion, harmdoers' 
self-attributions of responsibility were strongly positively correlated with guilt. 
Parkinson ' s Interpersonal View of Guilt 
Support for Parkinson ' s theory has emerged in the form of evidence that suggests 
that guilt arises in the absence of the type responsibility appraisals that are so central to 
appraisal accounts of guilt. There are many literary and philosophical examples of people 
who feel horrendously guilty for the misfortune of others , even in the absence of the kinds 
of responsibility-related self-appraisals that are considered to be critical in appraisal views 
of guilt (cf Ferguson , 1999). Examples of guilt in the absence of wrongdoing include 
survivor guilt, victim guilt, feeling guilty for being overbenefitted relative to another , and 
feeling guilty for not reciprocating another ' s love (Baumeister et al., 1994; Kroon , 1988). 
It is also well understood that the offices of mental health professionals are filled with 
clients who suffer from tremendously painful and chronic levels of guilt, even when they 
possess the objective understanding that they have done nothing for which they should be 
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held accountable (e.g., Caprara, Manzi, & Perugini, 1992; Ferguson & Eyre, 1998; 
Ferguson , Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer , & Ashbaker, 2000; Ferguson, Stegge , Miller, & Olsen, 
1999; Kubany et al., 1996; O'Connor, Berry, & Weiss, in press; Stegge & Ferguson , in 
press) . 
In a very recent study, Parkinson (1999, Study 1) asked participants to describe 
situations in which they had experienced guilt and they had concluded that there ''was a 
good reason for feeling this emotion " (reasonable guilt) or their guilt was experienced 
' 'without good reason " (unreasonable guilt). Some participants were also asked to recall 
situations in which they believed that they were to blame for disadvantaging another but 
did not feel guilty (the nonemotional incident) . Parkinson found that those participants 
who recalled "reasonable " guilt incidents were just as likely as those who recalled 
"unreasonable" guilt incidents to perce ive their guilt as being caused by having 
disadvantaged the other person , having done something that was inconsistent with the 
others ' motives, or wanting to apologize. In addition , ratings of the degree of self-blame in 
the reasonable and nonemotional accounts were equally high. Nonappraisal relevant 
explanations ( e.g. , the harm suffered by the other) were seen as more causative of guilty 
reactions than guilt-relevant appraisals (e.g. , self-blame). 
Treadwell (1999) also found evidence that contradicts the appraisal views of guilt 
by investigating the extent to which controllability (a component ofresponsibility 
appraisals) affects the degree of guilt experienced by perpetrators of various untoward 
events. Treadwell compared the impact of appraisals of controllability on the intensity of 
guilt experienced to that of interpersonal variables ( operationalized as the nature of the 
relationship between a perpetrator and his or her victim). Contrary to appraisal views of 
emotion, guilt intensity was found to be more affected by the quality of the 
relationship--whether the perpetrator and victim were friends, strangers, or 
enemies-than by beliefs about the controllability of the perpetrator ' s behavior in 
contributing to the negative outcome. Perpetrators felt most guilty when they had 
disadvantaged a stranger or especially a friend as opposed to an enemy, even though 
ratings of the perpetrator ' s ability to control the untoward outcome were highest in the 
enemy condition . 
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A study by Ferguson et al. (1997) provides additional support for two central 
assertions made by Parkinson , namely, that guilt arises in the absence of one 's own 
personal appraisals of responsibility and that guilt can change radically with time. Among 
other scenarios , participants read about events in which a perpetrator damaged another ' s 
property in a way that was unintended but controllable ( called "foreseeable ") or intended 
and controllable ( called ' 'unjustifiably intended" or, alternatively , "angry revenge "). 
Participants then rated the intensity of the guilt response that the actor would experience 
immediately following the event and then again after 24 hours had elapsed. Participants in 
the unjustifiably intended condition correctly acknowledged a high degree of responsibility 
but reported feeling little guilt immediately following the incident. In contrast , participants 
in the foreseeable condition , despite correctly acknowledging their minimal responsibility , 
imagined feeling the most guilt immediately following the incident. These results are 
consistent with interpersonalists ' views that self-perceptions ofresponsibility do not 
automatically elicit feelings of guilt. It is particularly noteworthy that one day later, 
participants' ratings of guilt increased as a function of the actor's perceived level of 
responsibility, rating guilt as highest in the unjustifiably intended responsibility condition 
and lower in the foreseeable condition. 
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Ferguson et al. (1997) suggested that-among other potential explanations for the 
observed reversal in guilty feelings from Time 1 to Time 2- is the possibility that 
perpetrators in the foreseeable condition adopted the victims ' perspective on the event 
from its very beginning because perpetrators were concerned that their victims might hold 
them responsible. Ferguson et al. reasoned that as time passed and perpetrators and 
victim, had the opportunity to interact , perpetrators became aware that their victims in 
this condition did not hold them responsible . In contrast , perpetrators who willfully took 
revenge on victims likely had little cause to attend to victims' perspectives immediately 
after the event , since perpetrators felt justified in exacting vengeance on them. Ferguson et 
al. suggested that with the passage of time , allowing for anger to diminish, perpetrators in 
this condition were able to attend to their victims' potential views of the event , including 
their victims ' appraisals that perpetrators were responsible . In essence , then , Ferguson et 
al. provided evidence consistent with the notions that : (a) unintentional yet controllable 
events prime the victim' s perspective at the outset ; (b) people in them are concerned that 
their behavior will be viewed as both intentional and controllable , and thus morally 
reprehensible; and ( c) this is the reason they report relatively high immediate 
posttransgression feelings of guilt, with their guilty feelings declining with time because 
they realize that the victim's real perspective on the causes of the event is similar to their 
own perceptions that they knew were true from the outset. 
Ferguson and colleagues ' findings (Ferguson et al., 1997) align closely with 
interpersonal views of guilt. In particular , although certain interpersonalists like 
Baumeister et al. (1994) downplay the importance ofresponsibility perceptions in 
accounting for guilt's arousal , Parkinson (1997) nonetheless explicitly recognized their 
critical role within the interpersonal context in which guilt plays out. He stated: 
From an interpersonal point of view, ... the guilt does not depend purely on 
personal appraisals or evaluations, but also on the relational position and 
assumed interpretation of the individual to whom the guilt is directed .... 
From the imagined perspective of the victim, the guilty person is seen as 
someone who ought to have been able to help with or avert whatever went 
amiss ... [ and] the perpetrator feels a communicative need for apology in 
order to avert the inferred reflected blame. (1997 , p . 75, emphasis added) 
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Parkinson thus implies that the perpetrator must attend to the victim' s perspective 
in order for the person to feel highly guilty. Of course , as Ferguson and others suggested , 
the perpetrator may not always adopt the victim's perspective or feel the need to avert the 
inferred reflected blame when they feel justified or when other instrumental considerations 
are salient. It is also important to note that not everyone will shift, with the passage of 
time, to the victim' s perspective on an event that perpetrators initially view as justified. 
Whether a shift occurs across time under these conditions obviously depends very greatly 
on a wide variety of factors , including the nature of the relationship between the involved 
parties, which also is a variable heavily emphasized by the interpersonalists. As Ferguson 
et al. stated, "Not all individuals ... undergo this particular shift in perspective. For example, 
had we changed the relationship between perpetrator and victim to one of arch enemies 
rather than intimate relatives or friends, we might easily imagine no shift in perspective" 
(pp. 671-672). 
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Although the assertions of Ferguson et al. (1997) regarding the role of shifts of 
perspective in guilty feelings have not been empirically tested, they do suggest that a test 
of the comparative roles of appraisal and interpersonal factors in guilt must take into 
account the perspective taken by participants and how perspective may shift with time as a 
function of the nature of the relationship. 
Integrating Appraisal with Interpersonal Accounts of Guilt 
Research evidence supports the conclusion that shifts in perspective ( an 
interpersonal event) across time account for shifts in emotional response. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence is consistent with the notion the nature of relationship between 
perpetrators and victims (yet another interpersonal factor) is also likely to influence 
whether a shift in perspective ever occurs . On the other hand, it has been shown that shifts 
in perspective are likely to be affected by perpetrators ' appraisals of justification. 
Moreover , it has been argued that shifts in perspective impact feelings of guilt because 
they lead perpetrators to attend to their victims' appraisals of perpetrators' responsibility . 
Thus, it appears that in order to begin to appreciate the origins of guilty feelings, one must 
attend to both interpersonal and appraisal factors. 
But what of Parkinson's ( 1995, 1997) assertions concerning identity claims, which 
ascribe little causal role to appraisals? Parkinson ' s premise concerning identity claims is 
based on the belief that emotions are communicative phenomena. Implicit in the 
expression of emotion is a claim regarding how one wishes to be viewed or treated. 
Expressions of guilt thus serve to convey a request for forgiveness-''view me differently, 
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not as the terrible person that I perceive you see me as." It is here that Parkinson's views 
rejoin the ideas set forth in the preceding paragraphs. Put simply, this analysis suggests 
that embedded within identity claims are the acknowledged appraisals of others . Thus, 
consistent with Parkinson's views, a perpetrator feels guilty as a means of communicating 
that he or she wishes to be forgiven because the perpetrator acknowledges the victim's 
appraisals. Viewed logically, it is the perpetrator's perceptions of victim's appraisals that 
lead him or her to conclude that the relationship is threatened. According to Parkinson , it 
is this threat that leads one to communicate that one values the relationship and wishes to 
make amends. This communication of valuing the relationship and desiring to make 
amends elicits guilt. Thus logically, appraisals lead to interpersonal threats which, in turn, 
give rise to identity claims, which elicit guilt. Viewed in this way, it appears possible that 
both interpersonal and traditional appraisal views of guilt may actually be valid, depending 
on when emotions are measured during the unfolding emotional process and also 
depending upon whether appraisals are measured from the perspective of perpetrators or 
their victims. 
Implications and Prediction 
Implications 
There are several empirical implications of the above line of reasoning. The first is 
that whether one finds support for traditional, appraisal-based predictions regarding 
feelings of guilt depends on whether the appraisals measured are those of the self versus 
the victim. As noted, the selfs and victim's perceptions do not necessarily agree. That is, 
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people can know they did not intend to harm another , yet feel concerned that the other 
will nonetheless hold them responsible . The second is that people will be more likely to 
weigh (albeit unconsciously) the victim's perceptions (rather than their own, sometimes 
contradictory attributions) in their immediate and subsequent feelings of guilt the less they 
had a justification for the event prior to its unfolding. The third is that pre-event 
justifications delay the transgressor's likelihood of adopting the victim's perspective and 
thus of feeling guilty; all that matters for them immediately is their own sense of 
justification. The fourth is that the nature of the relationship importantly affects whether 
the shift in perspective will ever take place when one initially feels justified , no matter how 
much time passes (as attested to by the behaviors of many unrepentant criminals, who 
persist in dehumanizing their victims, thereby refusing to engage in a psychological 
relationship with them, which decreases taking the victim' s perspective and therefore 
experiencing feelings of guilt). 
The overall purpose of the present study was to examine these empirical 
implications in a way that would build upon appraisal and interpersonal theories of 
emotion to explore how these theories may be integrated into a more comprehensive 
theory that takes into account perspective shifts across time as a function of the nature of 
relationship between perpetrators and victims. These empirical implications were 
examined by exploring one major question: How are emotions differentially affected by 
interpersonal factors (i.e., communication of identity claims or the tendency to weigh 
heavily the victim's perspective) and the private appraisals an individual makes about his 
or her own behavior at different points in time and from different perspectives? This major 
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question was investigated by addressing five component questions : (a) do identity claims 
take precedence over one's own private beliefs regarding the "correct " appraisals when a 
person first responds emotionally to an event that they did not intend?, (b) do identity 
claims in these kinds of situations affect the appraisals the person makes from the victim ' s 
point of view?, (c) when the selfs appraisals are incongruent with those expected by 
victims, as is the case in unintentionally harmful events , do the latter impact the initial 
emotional response more than the former?, (d) do the selfs private appraisals take 
precedence over identity claims or the victim' s appraisals when a person first responds 
emotionally to an event which they intended , but for which they feel justified ?, and ( e) 
how does this emotional response change across time in connection with potentially 
changing identity claims and adoption of the victim's perspective on the event? 
Study.Predictions 
Responses to the foregoing questions emerged from tests of the following 
predictions: 
1. In cases of harm unintentionally inflicted upon a friend, perpetrators ' identity 
claims of "forgive me" and perpetrators ' perceptions of victims' appraisals immediately 
following a harmful event will equally predict the degree of guilt experienced by 
perpetrators immediately following the event. Perpetrators ' perceptions of victims' 
appraisals will also predict perpetrators ' identity claims of "forgive" me both immediately 
following the event and later in time. 
2. In cases in which the harm is intentionally caused to a friend, perpetrators 
perceptions of victims' appraisals immediately following the incident will not predict 
perpetrators' immediate emotional response but will predict perpetrators' guilty feelings 
later in time. 
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3. In cases of intentional harm to a friend, perpetrators' identity claims of"treat me 
differently" immediately following the event will predict perpetrators's guilty feelings 
immediately following the event. 
4. In cases of intentional harm to a friend, perpetrators' identity claims of "forgive 
me" later in time will predict perpetrators' guilty feelings later in time. 
5. In cases of either unintentional or intentional harm inflicted upon an enemy, 
perpetrators ' self appraisals will predict perpetrators' guilt feelings both immediately 





Three-hundred fifteen participants (147 males and 168 females) were recruited 
from among students attending undergraduate courses at a medium-sized university in the 
Rocky Mountain region of the United States. Students were offered extra-credit points in 
exchange for their participation . The discussion of power below explains the number of 
people targeted for participation. 
Research Design and Operationalization of Independent Variables 
A 2 x 3 x 2 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship x 
Time) mixed factorial design , with time assigned as a within-subjects factor , was used to 
investigate their effects on ratings of emotions experienced , the relevant appraisals made , 
and the identity claims struck. The operationalization of the first independent variable , 
responsibility level, was achieved by presenting participants with scenarios that described 
the interaction of two persons in which the behavior of one person (perpetrator) caused 
harm to the other person (victim). Participants received one of two scenarios, representing 
the two levels of the responsibility level factor : (a) the perpetrator unintentionally caused 
harm by engaging in behavior that was negligent or reckless and which could have been 
avoided (labeled the "foreseeable" condition) and (b) the perpetrator intentionally acted 
out of anger to inflict harm (labeled the "angrily intended" condition), see Appendix A. 
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The second independent variable, perspective, included three levels. Prior to being 
presented with a scenario, one third of participants were instructed to imagine themselves 
as the perpetrator. This perpetrator condition most closely resembles all prior research 
studying guilt and its antecedents, be they interpersonally or appraisal-related. Another 
third of the participants were instructed to imagine themselves as the victim. In addition, a 
third level of this factor was a no perspective condition, in which the remaining third of the 
participants received no instructions pertaining to perspective, but were presented with the 
scenarios as an outside, neutral observer. The wording of scenarios was appropriately 
altered to support the perspective instructions (see Appendix A). 
The third independent variable, nature of relationship , was operationalized by 
explicitly informing participants that the actors depicted in each scenario were either 
friends or enemies, as further described in Appendix A. 
Finally, the manipulation of the fourth independent variable, time, was 
operationalized by requesting that participants complete dependent measures assuming 
that the event portrayed in the scenario has just happened. Participants were then 
scheduled to return again after the passage of a least 24 hours and they completed the 
same series of questionnaires . 
For each of the 12 primary conditions , three different scenarios were developed 
and presented to participants. Including three different scenarios was done to enhance 
generalizability, but effects due to specific scenarios were not analyzed. Of the 24 
participants in each of the 12 primary cells, 4 male and 4 female participants were 
randomly assigned to each of the three scenarios. Some scenarios were based on those 
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used successfully in past research ( e.g. , Treadwell , 1999) . However, since new scenarios 
were also included, all scenarios were pilot tested to ensure that the independent variables 
were perceived as intended. 
Power Analysis 
There are 12 primary cells in the between-subjects portion of the design. Equal 
numbers of males and females were randomly assigned to each of these cells. Given these 
parameters, each cell was to include 24 participants (12 male, 12 female). Note that the 
additional factor of participant gender was included to enhance generalization and is not a 
focus ofthis dissertation. The power analysis thus focused on the three between-subjects 
factors - responsibility level, perspective , and nature of relationship . A power analysis 
(Glass & Hopkins , 1996) for main effects for these 12 primary between-subjects cells only, 
with effect sizes estimated at 0.50 and cell sizes of 24 , resulted in power greater than 0.99. 
The cell size needed to assure adequate power to test the main effects automatically 
assured adequate power for testing the interactions (Cohen, 1988). 
Manipulation Checks 
It was imperative to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of the independent 
variables perspective , responsibility level, and nature of relationship. At the same time, it 
was also important not to focus participants' attention on these aspects only, since doing 
so would sensitize them to the demands of the experiment. Participants were asked to 
respond to a series of questions, some of which measured their perceptions of the 
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manipulated variables and others of which were meant as distractor items, immediately 
after completing the dependent measures at Time 1 and Time 2. The manipulation control 
questionnaire included a total of 15 questions (see Appendix B), with 8 of them 
representing distractor items dispersed throughout the questionnaire. 
Checks on the Perspective Manipulation 
To assess the effectiveness of the perspective manipulation, participants in the 
perpetrator and victim conditions (but not the "no perspective" condition) were asked to 
(a) freely recall what they (as the perpetrator or victim) were doing in the scenario and (b) 
rate how successful they were in putting themselves in that perspective . These participants 
were asked these questions only with regard to the actual perspective they were 
encouraged to adopt. Participant responses to the question of what they were doing in the 
scenario were coded for content that reflected behavior of the perpetrator , the victim, 
both , or neither. For example , if a participant indicated that "I broke my friend's statue ," 
this would have been coded as reflecting behavior of the perpetrator and received a score 
of 1 for that statement. A description that "I fell and spilled my drinks all over the floor ," 
was coded as reflecting behavior of the victim and received a code of 2 for that statement. 
Responses that suggested behavior of both the perpetrator and the victim, such as, "I hurt 
my friend and she hurt me," received a score of 3. Any response that was not eligible for 
a score of 1, 2, or 3, received a score of 4 for that response. Thus, coding resulted in a 
categorical variable with a range from 1 to 4. Coding was completed by a research 
assistant who was blind to the study's hypotheses. A sample representing 10% of 
responses was randomly selected, recoded, and analyzed for inter-rater reliability. 
Inter-rater reliability was found to be acceptable (81 % ) based upon a two-way random 
intra-class correlation procedure . 
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Participants in the "no perspective" condition were not given instructions to adopt 
a particular perspective. Because the design of the study is based on allowing participants 
in the no-perspective condition to freely and unconsciously adopt or not adopt a 
perspective, or to shift from one perspective to another, it seemed that asking participants 
in the no-perspective condition which perspective they had taken might risk firmly 
anchoring their judgments, leaving them little room to demonstrate a shift in perspective 
from Time 1 to Time 2 as would be expected based on the Ferguson et al. (1997) study . 
Thus , it was deemed ill-advised to directly or indirectly assess the perspective taken by 
those in the no-perspective condition. 
Checks on Perceptions of Responsibility 
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of responsibility, participants were 
asked to rate the degree to which the perpetrator's behavior was foreseeable (avoidable) , 
intentional , and justified at Time 1. The wording of questions was appropriately altered 
for each of the three perspective conditions. For scoring purposes these scales were 
divided into seven intervals (1 = Slightly , 4 = Moderately , 7 = Extremely) An example of 
questions to assess the manipulation of responsibility in the perpetrator perspective 
condition at Time 1 follows: 
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, to 
what degree did you believe the breaking of the vase could 
have been avoided? 
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then , to 
what degree did you believe the breaking of the vase was 
intentional? 
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, how 
justified did you feel in having broken the vase? 
Checks on Perceived Nature of Relationship 
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of the nature ofrelationship , an 
additional set of questions asked participants to choose the word that best described the 
nature of the relationship between the individuals portrayed in the story (i.e., strangers , 
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friends , siblings, neighbors , enemies) and to rate the degree of likeability between the two 
people depicted in the story . Ratings were made on a 7-point scale ranging from Not at 
All to Very Much . The two questions used to assess the manipulation of nature of 
relationship follow: 






I don't remember 
Outside of this particular incident, how much would you say 
that the two people generally like each other? 
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Dependent Variables 
Three dependent variables were measured at Time 1 and again at Time 2 for all 
participants: appraisals regarding the responsibility of the perpetrator for the damage 
caused, the nature and intensity of the emotions experienced by the perpetrator, and the 
identity claims struck by both the perpetrator and the victim. Participants were provided 
with the text of the applicable scenario at the beginning of each dependent measure section 
at Time 1. At Time 2, participants were provided with a gist of the scenario once, prior to 
beginning the section containing the dependent measures. An overview of these measures 
is provided below ( more specifics regarding these questions are included in Appendices C, 
D, and E). All dependent measures were pilot tested to ensure their effectiveness. 
Appraisals 
After having been presented with an interaction between the two people , 
participants were asked to re-read the scenario. Participants in all conditions were then 
asked to focus their attention on specific elements of the scenarios they had read from the 
perspective they had been asked to adopt earlier (e.g. , In the Perpetrator/Time I/Friend 
condition: "Focus your attention on the fact that you just destroyed your friend's vase ... ") 
or they were not reminded of the need to adopt a perspective ("no-perspective" 
condition). They then were asked to separately rate the degree to which the perpetrator's 
behavior was avoidable, intentional, and/or justified. The wording of questions was 
appropriately altered for each of the three perspective conditions (see Appendix C). For 
scoring purposes these scales were divided into seven intervals (1 = Slightly, 
4 = Moderately, 7 = Extremely) An example of questions to measure appraisals in the 
perpetrator perspective condition at Time 1 follows: 
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, to 
what degree did you believe the breaking of the vase could 
have been avoided? 
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, to 
what degree did you believe the breaking of the vase was 
intentional? 
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, how 
justified did you feel in having broken the vase? 
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Participants in the Perpetrator condition were also asked to adopt the perspective 
of their victims and to make similar ratings of avoidability, intentionality, and justification 
from the point of view of their victims at Time 1 and again at Time 2. For scoring 
purposes these scales were divided into seven intervals ( 1 = Slightly, 4 = Moderately, 7 = 
Extremely; see Appendix C). These questions were positioned after all other dependent 
measures. 
Emotional Responses 
Participants in all conditions were again asked to focus their attention on specific 
elements of the scenarios they had read (e.g., In the Perpetrator/Time I/Friend condition: 
"When you focus on your havingjust destroyed your friend's vase ... ") and were asked to 
rate the degree to which the perpetrator felt any of seven emotions, including guilt (i.e., 
angry, proud, happy, guilty, afraid, ashamed, and/or embarrassed). Ratings were made on 
a 7-point scale ranging from Very Mildly to Extremely. Participants were asked about 
several different emotions to avoid focusing them on the target emotion of guilt, yet their 
guilt ratings were the ones used to test the main predictions. The wording of questions 
was appropriately altered for each of the three perspective conditions (see Appendix D). 
An example of questions designed to measure emotional response in the 
perpetrator perspective condition at Time 1 follows: 
Identity Claims 
It is immediately after the vase was broken . Right then, to 
what extent were you really feeling any of the following 




guilty ... and so forth. 
Participants in all conditions were then presented with 15 brief statements 
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reflecting various identity claims ( e.g. , "I wish to be forgiven") and were asked to rate the 
extent to which the perpetrator was attempting to make each claim. Ratings were made on 
a 7-point scale anchored by Not at All and To a Great Extent (1 = Not at All , 4 = 
Somewhat , 7 =Toa Great Extent) . Wording of questions was altered to fit each 
perspective condition (see Appendix E) . For purposes of this dissertation , ratings of the 
identity claims pertinent to guilt (I wish to be forgiven) and anger (I want to be treated 
better) only were incorporated into analyses. 
An example of the questions relating to identity claims for the perpetrator 
perspective condition at Time 1 follows: 
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, I 
was communicating that (followed by series of identity 
claims) 
I deserve to be respected 
I wish to be forgiven 
I expect better treatment...and so forth. 
Procedure 
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Participants were scheduled in small groups to arrive at an unoccupied classroom . 
Upon arrival, students were randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions. All participants 
were asked to complete a statement oflnformed Consent, a copy of which is found in 
Appendix F. Participants then received a brief explanation of the purposes of the 
experiment. Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to "explore how 
people perceive everyday events as well as their thoughts and emotional reactions to those 
events ." 
Having been presented with the purpose of the study , participants next received a 
description of the written materials they were asked to read and the responses they were 
required to give. Participants were instructed that they were to read a brief story and to 
respond to the questions that followed. Research packets were then distributed . Research 
packets contained a cover page, which included directions for completing all materials in 
the packet , a scenario page, which provided the experimental manipulation, and four to six 
pages that included the questions and scales comprising the dependent measures and the 
manipulation check questionnaire (see Appendix G). An effort was then made to resolve 
any procedural questions. Upon completion of the instructions and resolution of any 
questions, participants were encouraged to begin. When they had completed the 
dependent measures at Time 1, participants were asked to complete and retain the 
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Research Packet Tracking Sheet (see Appendix H) that was affixed to their packet of 
questionnaires and were reminded to return to the same classroom approximately 24 hours 
later. Upon returning, participants presented the Research Packet Tracking Sheet to 
receive the appropriate Time 2 research packet (see Appendix G) and were asked to 
complete the same series of dependent measures. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Organization of Results 
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The results of analyses are presented in two main sections. The first section 
summarizes results regarding participants' perceptions of the independent variables that 
were manipulated. The second section presents the results of the analyses that were 
designed to test each of the specific predictions outlined in Chapters I and II. Each section 
or subsection begins with a statement of the particular set of questions or specific 
prediction to be addressed . This restatement of the question or prediction is followed , 
first, by a brief review of the analyses that were chosen to address the question or 
prediction ; and second , by the results of the analyses. 
For tests of any of the specific predictions involving correlation coefficients and 
planned comparisons involving means or correlation coefficients , an alpha level of .05 was 
selected. Tests of statistical significance of differences between pairs of correlation 
coefficients were computed using the Hotelling ! method in the case of dependent 
correlations (i.e., when drawn from the same subjects) and using a Fisher Z. transformation 
in the case of independent correlations (i.e. , drawn from different subjects). Planned 
comparisons of statistical significance of mean differences were conducted using the Dunn 
method with a family-based alpha level (Glass & Hopkins, 1996). Of course , the 
"statistical significance" of any of these effects does not mean that they are practically or 
substantively significant ( e.g., Cohen, 1988). That is, the size of the effects also needs to 
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be considered. What is a small, moderate, or large effect size is subject to lively debate and 
relative to the area of study. For purposes of this investigation, correlation coefficients less 
than .30 are considered small, since the variance shared is less than 10%, but coefficients 
of .50 are considered "large," as the linear variance they share is 25% or greater (cf 
Cohen, 1988). Estimates of effect size concerning the magnitude of mean differences were 
evaluated using one of two methods. For simple main effects, estimates of eta squared 
were used to higrJight the proportion of variability in the dependent variable that was 
explained by variation in the independent variable. Small, medium, and large effects for eta 
squared are generally considered to be .01, .06, and .14, respectively (Cohen, 1988). For 
more sophisticated analyses, involving several levels of the independent variable or 
complex interactions , estimates of the magnitude of mean differences were computed 
using the standardized mean difference effect size (Glass & Hopkins , 1996). Conventional 
standards for interpreting standard mean difference effect sizes are .2 for a small effect, .5 
for a medium effect , and .8 for a large effect (Cohen, 1988). Due to the exploratory nature 
of the study and the limitations of power associated with analysis of interactions involving 
five independent variables, effects involving gender of the participant were not considered . 
Because of the considerable number of predictions to be tested there are many results to 
be reported and digested . As an aid to the reader , the major results are summarized at the 
end of each section. 
43 
Checks on Effectiveness of Manipulations 
The first series of analyses focused on whether participants in each of the 12 
primary conditions correctly perceived the manipulated level of responsibility (foreseeable 
or angrily intended),perspective (perpetrator , victim, or no perspective) , and nature of 
relationship (friend or enemy) at Time 1. Checks of these same perceptions at Time 2 
were not conducted for the dissertation, since it was primarily appraisals at the time the 
event initially occurred in which the author was interested. Furthermore , it was deemed 
unnecessary to assess participants' perceptions of the manipulation of time, as time was 
not "manipulated" as were other independent variable though materials presented to 
participants but was an experimental effect actually experienced by participants . 
In all, as the reader will see below , the manipulations were generally successful. 
The two harmful events were differentiated appropriately in terms of intentionality and 
justification and, as expected , they did not differ in terms of avoidability . The perspective 
manipulation generally worked , with participants in both the perpetrator and victim 
conditions correctly identifying with their assigned roles. The same is true for the 
relationship manipulation , in which participants perceived the nature of the relationship as 
being more amicable in the friend condition as intended . There were , however , some 
statistically significant interactions that indicate limitations on some of the manipulations. 
These variations are reported in detail in the following section. 
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Responsibility Manipulation 
It was important to ascertain the extent to which participants correctly interpreted 
the information provided regarding the perpetrator's responsibility for the harm done . 
Viewed in terms ofHeider's (1958) analysis of the components ofresponsibility, the 
incidents of angrily intended harm portrayed events that were intended,justified , but that 
could have been avoided. The incidents labeled as "foreseeable," on the other hand, were 
not intended, they could have been avoided, but because there was no provocation for the 
incident they likely also would be perceived as less justified. Thus, participants in the 
angrily intended condition should have perceived perpetrators as acting with greater 
intentionality and greater justification than those in the foreseeable condition. The two 
responsibility conditions were not expected to differ with respect to participants ' 
perceptions of the extent to which the harm could have been avoided (Heider , 1958). 
Perception of avoidability. The first analysis considered whether participants in 
both the foreseeable and the angrily intended conditions perceived the harm as similarly 
avoidable in the two conditions. In this analysis, a 2 x 3 x 2 (Responsibility Level x 
Perspective x Nature of Relationship) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on 
participants' ratings of the extent to which they viewed the harm inflicted at Time 1 as 
avoidable ( 1 = Not at All; 7= Very Much) . The results of this analysis, shown in Table 1, 
revealed no statistically significant main effects or interactions. An estimate of effect size 
for the factor ofresponsihility level, also shown in Table 1, revealed that essentially none 
of the variability in ratings of avoidability was explained by differences in responsibility 
level. This result suggests that participants in both the foreseeable ( x = 5.23, SD= 1.82) 
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Table 1 
Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Perpetrator Foreseeability Ratings 
at Time 1 
Source df 
.E Eta2 
Between subjects effects 
Responsibility Level (RL) 1 .262 .001 
Perspective (P) 2 2.430 .016 
Relationship (R) .777 .003 
RLxP 2 2.303 .015 
RLxR .183 .001 
PxR 2 1.545 .010 
RLxPxR 2 1.248 .008 
Error 305 (3.557) 
Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors . 
and the angrily intended ( X = 5.13, SD= 1.99) conditions perceived the perpetrator ' s 
behavior as equally avoidable , consistent with the intended effect of the manipulation of 
responsibility level. 
Perceptions of intentionality. The second series of analyses was based upon the 
results of a 2 x 3 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship) 
between-subjects ANOVA conducted on participants ' ratings of the degree to which 
participants viewed perpetrators as acting to intentionally inflict harm at Time 1 ( 1 = Not at 
All; 7= Very Much). The results, shown in Table 2, revealed a main effect ofresponsibility 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Perpetrator Intentionality Ratings 
at Time 1 
Source df E 
Between subjects effects 
Responsibility Level (RL) 1 







Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors. 

















level and of nature ofrelationship. The Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship 
interaction was not statistically significant. 
With respect to the main effect of responsibility level, mean ratings of intentionality 
in the angrily intended condition (X = 5.54, SD= 1.83) were statistically significantly 
greater than those in the foreseeable condition (X = 3.48, SD= 2.24). The eta squared 
estimate of effect size (.21) indicates that a significant proportion of the variability in 
ratings of intentionality was explained by responsibility level. These findings demonstrate 
that participants in the angrily intended condition viewed perpetrators as acting with 
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greater intent than those in the foreseeable condition, consistent with the intended effect of 
the manipulation of responsibility level. 
The main effect for nature of relationship shows that mean ratings of intentionality 
in the enemy condition ( X = 4.80, SD = 2.21) were statistically significantly greater than 
mean ratings in the friend condition (X = 4.23, SD= 2.34). The eta squared estimate of 
effect size for the main effect of nature of relationship, however , revealed that only a very 
small proportion, 2%, of the variability in ratings of intentionality was explained by 
variation in the nature of relationship. These results suggest that participants' perceptions 
of the intentionality of perpetrators behavior were not meaningfully different with respect 
to nature of relationship condition. 
Perceptions of justifiability. The third series of analyses, similar to those just 
described , began with a 2 x 3 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of 
Relationship) between-subjects ANOVA conducted on participants ' ratings of the extent 
to which they perceived perpetrators as being justified for inflicting harm at Time 1 
(1= Not at All; 7= Very Much). The results , shown in Table 3, revealed a main effect of 
perspective and two statistically significant interactions for Responsibility Level x 
Perspective and Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship. Notably , 
there was no main effect of responsibility level. These results indicate that the intended 
manipulation of justifiability was not uniformly successful. That is, participants' 
perceptions that angrily intended harm was more justifiable than foreseeable harm did not 




Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Perpetrator Justification Ratings at 
Time 1 
Source df E 
Between subjects effects 














Note . Values in parentheses are mean square errors. 

















The Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction is 
graphically depicted in Figure I. To better understand perceptions of justifiability, a 
Responsibility Level x Perspective ANOVA was conducted on these ratings in each of the 
two relationship conditions separately. This analysis revealed a main effect of perspective, 
E (2, 153) = 12.40, 12 < .001, in the enemy condition. In the enemy condition, participants 
in the perpetrator (X = 3.77, SD= 1.96) and victim (X = 3.59, SD= 2.29) conditions 
viewed perpetrators as being more justified than participants in the no-perspective 
condition ( X = 2.04, SD = 1.60). In the friend condition, a Responsibility Level x 
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of the Responsibility Level x 




To further understand this two-way interaction , a series of one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted on ratings of justifiability for each of the three perspective conditions separately 
within the friend condition. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of responsibility 
level, .E (1,50) = 10.29, Q <.01, for participants in the victim/friend condition, such that 
participants viewed perpetrators as more justified in the angrily intended ( X = 4.12 , 
SD= 1.67) than the foreseeable ( X = 2.48, SD= 1.99) condition. The same difference 
was not found to be statistically significant in either the perpetrator/friend or the no-
perspective/friend condition. The eta squared estimate of effect size associated with the 
main effect of responsibility level in the victim/friend condition ( eta squared = .17) 
suggests that a significant proportion of the variability in justifiability ratings was 
accounted for by the responsibility level factor. 
Considered as a whole , the expectation that participants would view perpetrators' 
behaviors as more justifiable in the angrily intended than in the foreseeable condition was 
confirmed only when they were asked to adopt the victim ' s perspective and when the 
characters in the story were depicted as friends. 
Pers2ective Mani2ulation 
Several analyses bear on the question of whether participants perceived the 
manipulation of perspective in the intended manner. In the first analysis , participants in the 
perpetrator and victim conditions were reminded that they were asked to imagine that they 
were one of the people in the scenario they read. Participants were then asked, "What did 
you do in the story?" Responses were coded for content that reflected behavior of the 
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perpetrator, the victim, both, or neither (see Chapter III for a complete description of 
coding method and coefficients of inter-rater reliability). The proportion of participants' 
responses (perspective perceived) was then compared across perspective conditions using 
a chi-square analysis. This analysis resulted in a statistically significant association between 
perspective condition and perspective perceived, x2 (2, N = 206) = 190.65, .Q < .001. 
Analysis of the proportions in Table 4 revealed that participants were able to correctly 
identify their role as perpetrator in the perpetrator condition and victim in the victim 
condition. 
A follow-up analysis addressed the question of whether participants in the two 
perspective conditions differed with respect to their ability to assume the assigned role of 
perpetrator or victim. A 2 x 2 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of 
Relationship) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants' Time 1 ratings of 
the degree to which they were able to "put themselves in the shoes of the person [they] 
were asked to identify with" (1 = Not at All; 7= To a Great Extent). The results of the 
analysis are shown in Table 5. These analyses revealed main effects of perspective and of 
relationship. Identification ratings in the victim condition ( X = 5.39, SD= 1.24) were 
greater than in the perpetrator condition ( X = 4. 97, SD = 1.52) and identification ratings 
were greater in the friend condition ( X = 5.42, SD= 1.25) than in the enemy condition 
( x = 4.95, SD= 1.49). 
The statistically significant Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction 
indicates that participants' ability to identify with their assigned role did not hold 
independently of the perspective taken or the relationship between the perpetrator 
Table 4 
Percentage and Number of Participants Identifying Their Role as Perpetrator, Victim, or 
Neither as a Function of Perspective Condition 
Perspective condition 
Perspective perceived Perpetrator Victim 
Perpetrator 93% (n = 94) 4 % (n = 4) 
Victim 0% (n= O) 96 % (n = 101) 
Neither 7% (n= 7) o % (n = O) 
Total 100 % (n = 101) 100 % (n = 105) 
Table 5 
Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Identification Ratings at Time 1 
Source 









Between subjects effects 
1 
200 
Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors. 


















and victim. The interaction is graphically depicted in Figure 2. In an effort to decompose 
the Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction, two follow-up ANOV As were 
conducted on identification ratings using perspective as the factor for each level of nature 
of relationship. This analysis revealed no statistically significant main effect in the friend 
condition for the identification rating and the eta squared estimate of effect size was 0. 
With respect to the enemy condition, a statistically significant main effect of perspective 
was found, .E (1, 103) = 10.07, Q < .01. Identification ratings in the victim condition 
( x = 5.38, SD= 1.29) were statistically significantly greater than those in the perpetrator 













Figure 2. Graphical representation of the Perspective x Nature of Relationship 
interaction for mean identification ratings. 
effect (eta squared= .09) suggests that variation in identification ratings was only 
moderately explained by variation in the perspective condition. 
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Taken together , these results indicate the participants in the perpetrator and victim 
conditions were able to correctly identify the role to which they were assigned. 
Participants in the victim and friend conditions were able to identify with their assigned 
role to a greater degree than those in the perpetrator or enemy conditions. 
Relationship Manipulation 
Two analyses bear on the question of whether participants perceived the 
manipulation of the nature of the relationship in the intended manner. The first analysis 
approached the question of whether participants correctly perceived the relationship 
manipulation by conducting a 2 x 3 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of 
Relationship) between-subjects ANOVAs on participants ' Time I ratings of how much the 
two primary characters in each scenario liked one another (I= Not at All ; 7= Very Much). 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 6. The analysis revealed a statistically 
significant main effect of nature of relationship , such that mean ratings for liking were 
highest in the friend condition ( X = 6.29 , SD = . 95) and lowest in the enemy condition 
( X = 1.68, SD = 1.42). The estimate of effect size for the main effect of nature of 
relationship revealed that 78% of the variability in likeability ratings was explained by 
variation in the nature of relationship factor. 
In addition to the main effect of nature of relationship, the Responsibility Level x 
Nature of Relationship interaction was also found to be statistically significant for ratings 
of likeability. Figure 3 presents this interaction graphically. To further explore this 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Likeability Ratings at Time I 
Source df 
.E Eta 2 
Between subjects effects 
Responsibility Level (RL) .002 .000 
Perspective (P) 2 1.249 .010 
Relationship (R) I 864.209*** .776 
RLxP 2 .589 .005 
RLxR 6.609** .026 
PxR 2 .024 .000 
RLxPxR 2 .956 .008 
Error 250 (1.446) 
Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors. 
**.Q < .01; ***p < .001. 
interaction, two follow-up ANOVAs were conducted on likeability ratings for each level 
of nature of relationship. This analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect of 
responsibility level in the friend condition, F(l, 129) = 4.11, .Q < .05, such that participants 
viewed the perpetrator and victim as liking each other more in the foreseeable condition 
( X = 6.44, SD= .83) than in the angrily intended condition ( X = 6.10, SD= 1.03) . 
However, the estimate of effect size for the responsibility level main effect revealed that 
very little of the variation in likeability ratings was explained by this factor ( eta squared 
= .03). No statistically significant differences were found in the enemy condition. 









Ang Int Foreseeable 
Friend Enemy 
Figure 3. Graphical representation of the Responsibility Level x Nature of 
Relationship interaction for mean ratings of likeability. 
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2% of the variation in likeability ratings was explained by variation in responsibility level. 
Thus , these results revealed that participants perceived protagonists as liking each other 
more in the friend than enemy condition at both levels of responsibility , indicating a 
successful manipulation of relationship. 
In the second analysis, participants were asked at Time 1 to select from a list of 
five choices, the word that best characterized the relationship of the two primary 
characters in the scenario ( 1 = enemies; 2 = siblings ; 3 = friends; 4 = strangers; 5 = I 
don 't remember). The proportion of participants' responses (relationship perceived) was 
then compared across relationship conditions using a chi-square analysis and resulted in a 
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statistically significant association between nature of relationship and the relationship 
perceived , x2 (1, N = 312) = 300 .23, Q. < .001. Analysis of the proportions , shown in Table 
7, revealed that participants were able to correctly identify the relationship between the 
two primary characters as friends in the friend condition and as enemies in the enemy 
condition. These results provided additional support to the finding that participants 
correctly perceived the relationship manipulation. 
Summary of Results Relevant to Manipulation Checks 
Several analyse s were conducted to assess the degree to which participants in each 
of the twelve primary conditions perceived the level of responsibilit y (foreseeable or 
angrily intended) , perspective (perpetrator , victim, or no perspective) , and nature of 
relationship (friend or enemy) as intended . Analysis of the responsibility level manipulation 
revealed that consistent with the intended effect , participants viewed the harm inflicted as 
equally foreseeable for both levels of responsibility. Also consistent with the intended 
manipulation of responsibility level, participants viewed perpetrators in the angrily 
intended condition as acting with greater intent than those in the foreseeable condition . 
Checks on the manipulation of justifiability revealed that participants viewed perpetrators 
as acting with greater justification in the angrily intended condition when asked to take the 
perspective of victims or when perpetrators and their victims were characterized as 
friends. 
Results of analyses relevant to the manipulation of perspective revealed that 
consistent with the study design, participants were able to correctly identify their role as 
58 
Table 7 
Percentage and Number of Participants Identifying the Relationship as Friends or Enemies 





Nature of relationship 
Friend 
100 % (n = 153) 
o % (n= O) 
100 % (n = 153) 
Enemy 
2 % (n = 3) 
98 % (n = 156) 
100 % (n = 159) 
perpetrator in the perpetrator condition and victim in the victim condition. The degree to 
which participants were able to adopt their assigned role varied somewhat by condition, 
such that participants in the victim and friend conditions were more likely to identify with 
their assigned roles. 
Finally, checks on the manipulation of nature of relationship demonstrated that 
participants were able to correctly label the relationship between the two characters 
depicted in the scenarios as friends in the friend condition and as enemies in the enemy 
condition. In addition , participants clearly rated these relationships as more friendly in the 
friend condition and less friendly in the enemy condition. 
Taken together, the results of analyses used to check the effectiveness of the 
manipulation of independent variables provided evidence that, with some minor variation, 
participants perceived the manipulation of independent variables in a manner consistent 
with the design of the study. The limited variation in participant perceptions of 
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independent variables does not pose a significant threat to the validity of the results of the 
main analyses. 
Analyses Relevant to Study Predictions 
This section presents the results of the analyses that were designed to test each of 
the very specific predictions outlined in Chapters I and II. Due to the large number of 
predictions and results, each prediction, along with its relevant results, are presented one 
at a time. Some synthesizing and reordering of predictions was undertaken to more closely 
align related predictions and their results . 
Two statistical paradigms were employed to test the predictions. The first series of 
analyses relied on Pearson product-moment bivariate correlations between ratings of 
perpetrator guilt, ratings of perpetrators ' self appraisals ofresponsibility , ratings of 
perpetrators ' perceptions of victims' appraisals, and ratings of perpetrator identity claims 
to investigate the extent to which any two variables were linearly related. Correlation 
coefficients were summarized in tables that include coefficients not bearing on the specific 
predictions outlined in Chapters I and II, but were included for the sake of completeness. 
Those coefficients that are germane to the test of a particular prediction are highlighted 
within the relevant table(s) . The second series of analyses relied on analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to test the effects ofresponsibility level, perspective, nature ofrelationship, and 
time on ratings of perpetrator guilt. 
Correlational Analyses Regarding the Role 
of Responsibility Appraisals in Guilt 
Predictions were introduced in Chapters I and II that specifically concerned the 
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extent to which perpetrators ' feelings of guilt should be associated with perpetrators ' own 
appraisals of responsibility versus perceptions of victims ' appraisals of their responsibility . 
These predictions all focused on the differential relationship of the two sources of 
appraisal (self-perceptions ofresponsibility versus projections regarding how responsible 
victims thought the perpetrators were) with the perpetrators' guilty feelings, taking into 
account differences in responsibility level, nature of relationship , and time. It should be 
remembered that these predictions were to be tested in the perpetrator condition only, 
since it was in this condition that ratings were assessed of the extent to which the 
perpetrator thought that the victim held them responsible. 
To test these predictions, two composites ofresponsibility appraisal were 
calculated . One of the composites concerned perpetrators' self-appraisals ofresponsibility 
and the other involved perpetrators ' perceptions of victims' responsibility appraisals . The 
first appraisal indicator was obtained by summing participant ratings of the degree to 
which the harm inflicted by perpetrators was viewed by perpetrators as foreseeable/ 
avoidable , intentional , and justified , to form a composite rating ofresponsibility. Because 
high ratings of justifiability were associated with a reduction in responsibility (in Heiderian 
terms) , justifiability scores were reversed prior to summation. Similarly, a summary 
appraisal indicator of perpetrators' perceptions that the victim held them responsible was 
obtained by summing participants' ratings of the degree to which the victim saw their 
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behavior as foreseeable/avoidable , intentional, and unjustified (with justifiability scores 
again reversed prior to summation). These composite scores representing perpetrator self 
appraisals and perpetrators perceptions of victims' appraisals were used in all tests of 
predictions involving appraisals. From this point forward , the label "perpetrators' 
appraisals" ( or slight variations thereof) is used to refer to the composite index of 
responsibility that was based on ratings of the how much the perpetrator perceived that 
the harm could be avoided, was intentional, and was unjustified. In contrast, the term 
"victims' appraisals" (or minor variations thereof) is used to refer to the composite index 
of how much participants thought that victims perceived that perpetrators were 
responsible , that is, could have avoided the harm intended it, and were unjustified for 
committing the deed. These descriptors were used for the sake of brevity. It should be 
noted further that the short-hand terms "guilt," "felt guilty," "feelings of guilt," and 
variat ions thereof are used to denote ratings or projection s of how guilty the perpetrator 
felt. 
Semi-partial versus zero-order correlation coefficients . In order to accurately 
compare the relationships between ratings of perpetrator guilt and the other variables of 
interest , it was necessary to take into account the degree to which these other variables 
(i.e., ratings of perpetrators ' self appraisals ofresponsibility , ratings of perpetrators ' 
perceptions of victims' appraisals , and ratings of perpetrator identity claims) were 
correlated. Table 8 presents the correlation coefficients that reflect the degree of inter-
relatedness between variables. Many of the correlations between perpetrator appraisals 
and victims appraisals , between guilt-related and anger-related identity claims, and 
Table 8 
Correlations Between Composite Perpetrator Appraisal Ratings, Composite Victim Appraisal Ratings, and Identity Claim Ratings at 




Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
Perpetrator Time 1 1.00 .55** .07 .24* 
appraisal 
composite Time 2 1.00 .28** .43** 
Victim Time 1 1.00 .57** 
appraisal 
composite Time 2 1.00 
Identity claim Time 1 
"I wish to be forgiven" 
Time 2 
Identity claim Time 1 
"I want to be treated 
better" Time 2 
Note. In columns, cells sharing superscripts in common do not differ significantly. 
*.P < .05, ** .P < .01. 
Identity claim Identity claim 
"I wish to be "I want to be 
forgiven" treated better" 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
.081 .09 .01 .00 
-.07 .It .05 .14 
.001 .06 .23* .28** 
-.13 .031 .07 .19 
1.00 .37** -.12 -.01 





between both sources of appraisal and both types of identity claims were statistically 
significant. Although the strength of the relationships varied from nonexistent (r = .00) to 
large (r = .57), these results indicate that the degree of association between variables 
necessitates calculating the correlation between guilt and other variables of interest , 
removing the target variable ' s association with related variables. For example, to more 
clearly understand the association between perpetrator guilt and perpetrator appraisals , 
one must look to the correlation between perpetrator guilt and perpetrator appraisal once 
the association between perpetrator guilt and related variables ( e.g. , victim appraisal) has 
been removed. This correlation coefficient , denoted as r1c23 i (Glass & Hopkins , 1996; 
Kleinbaum, Kupper , & Muller , 1988), is the semi-partial or part correlat ion coefficient and 
is used in this and subsequent sections to describe correla tions. Again, for the sake of 
completeness , the zero-order correlation coefficients (reflecting the correlation between 
variables without taking into account the relationship between the target variable and 
related variables) are made available in the relevant table(s) . 
Appraisal-guilt associations : Relationship and time. The association of guilt with 
perpetrator appraisal and victim appraisal was examined first ignoring the perpetrators ' 
level ofresponsibility for the harm done , but taking into account the nature of the 
relationship between the perpetrator and victim as well as the time at which these 
judgments were offered. 
Appraisal-guilt associations were examined first in the friend condition as a 
function of time. It will be recalled that the friend condition was meant to arouse 
perpetrators' concerns with their victims' points of view on the harm done. A part of the 
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victims' concerns could be expressed as the perpetrators' beliefs regarding how 
responsible victims held them. At the very least, then, there should be a significant guilt-
victim appraisal association in the friend condition which, if Parkinson is correct , should 
be statistically significant at both time points. This view does not, however, preclude 
predicting significant associations between guilt and perpetrators ' own appraisals. In fact, 
if the present study is to replicate previous studies, one should show a statistically 
significant association of guilt with perpetrator appraisai at least at Time 1. The results 
shown in Table 9 reveal the following: The guilt-victim appraisal link was not statistically 
reliable nor practically meaningful either at Time 1 (Ii<2 3i = -.10) or Time 2 (r 1<2 3i = .12). 
Although there is a tendency for guilt to be associated with perpetrator appraisal at Time 1 
(r 1<23l = .24), this effect is neither statistically nor substantively significant. It is at Time 2 
only (r 1c23 i = .39, Q < .01) that a notable association occurred between guilt and 
perpetrator appraisal. 
Appraisal-guilt associations were examined next in the enemy condition as a 
function of time. It was hypothesized that the guilt-perpetrator appraisal correlation 
coefficient should be statistically significant in the enemy condition and that these 
coefficients should not differ significantly as a function of the time at which judgments 
were made. The results in Table 9 bear out these expectations. The guilt-perpetrator 
appraisal association is significant at both time points in the enemy condition; both of these 
coefficients are large in terms of Cohen's rules of thumb (ri<23 is = .49 and .54, 
respectively), and they do not differ significantly. 
Table 9 
Correlations between Mean Perpetrator Guilt Ratings, Composite Appraisal Ratings, and Identity Claim Ratings as a Function 
of Nature of Relationship and Time 
Identity claim 
Perpetrator appraisal Victim appraisal Identity claim "I want to be treated 
composite composite "I wish to be forgiven" better" 
Guilt 
Relationship Rating Bivariate Semi" Bivariate Semi Bivariate Semi Bivariate Semi 
Friend Time I .23 .24. 1 -.07 -.10.1 .52** .50***1 -.11 -.02 
Time2 .51 ** .39**.1 .34* .12. 1 .62** .6) ***1 . 14 .09 
Enemy Time 1 .49** .49***.2 .12 .12.2 .26 .30*2 -.16 -.22 
Time 2 .56** .54***.2 . 13 .03/ .51 ** .46**2 .22 .05 
"The semi-partial correlation coefficients indicate the association between guilt and the target variable (e.g ., perpetrator appraisal) once 
the target variable's association with related variables (e.g., victim appraisal) has been removed. Across rows, cells sharing subscripts in 
common do not differ significantly. In columns, cells sharing superscripts in common do not differ significantly. 
*Q < .05, **Q < .0 I, ***Q < .00 I. 
°' v, 
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It was expected that the guilt-victim appraisal correlation coefficient should not be 
statistically significant either at Time 1 or Time 2 in the enemy condition. Congruent with 
this prediction, the guilt-victim appraisal correlation coefficients are not statistically 
significant (r 1c23 ls = .12 and .03, respectively) and share little variance in common (see also 
Table 9). 
Guilt in the enemy condition was expected to be more strongly correlated with 
perpetrator than with victim appraisal, a difference that should have been especially 
apparent at Time 1 but also true at Time 2. Table 9 shows that the association between 
guilt and perpetrator appraisal at Time 1 (ric2_3) = .49) and Time 2 (r 1<23 l = .54) was 
stronger than between guilt and victim appraisal at Time 1 (r 1c23 l = .12) and Time 2 
(r 1c23 ) = .03), although difference was statistically significant at Time 2 only. 
Based on these results from Table 9, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
perpetrator appraisals of responsibility do play a role in guilt (a) even when the perpetrator 
should be more motivated to adopt the victims' points of view (i.e., friend, particularly at 
Time 2) and (b) especially when one should not be motivated to be concerned with the 
victims' perspective (i.e. , the enemy condition). Thus, the assertion that responsibility 
appraisals from the selfs point of view are irrelevant to guilt (as the interpersonalists have 
argued) is not supported by these results . It is additionally crucial to recognize that the 
predicted role of victim appraisals in the guilt one feels is not supported by these results. 
Appraisal-guilt associations: Relationship, tin1e, and responsibility. Important 
predictions were offered regarding whether the guilt-perpetrator appraisal and guilt-victim 
appraisal associations would differ as a function of the nature of the perpetrators' 
responsibility level. The results relevant to responsibility level-based predictions are 
presented first for the friend condition and then for the enemy condition. 
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It was argued that even those perpetrators who were close friends of the victims 
would not be motivated to adopt the victims' points of view on the harm when this harm 
was angrily intended immediately after the harm took place. The expectation was that the 
association of guilt with victim appraisals would be significantly lower than the association 
of guilt with perpetrator appraisals at Time 1 in the angrily intended condition. A related 
implication was that the guilt-perpetrator association but not the guilt-victim association 
should be statistically significant at Time 1. Table 10 presents results bearing on both of 
these predictions. 
Let's examine the guilt-appraisal associations found in the angrily intended/friend 
condition at Time 1. In the angrily intended/friend condition at Time 1, the guilt-victim 
appraisal correlation is small and statistically nonsignificant (ric23 ) = -.14), but the guilt-
perpetrator appraisal correlation (Lc23 > = .40, 2 < .05) is statistically significant and 
somewhat more than "small" in size in Cohen's terms. These two coefficients were not 
statistically significantly different. In general, however, the magnitude of the difference 
between the two was as expected. 
Do the nature of the appraisal-guilt associations change at Time 2 in the angrily 
intended/friend condition? Recall that it was expected that perpetrators of angrily intended 
harm against their friends would tend to adopt the victims' viewpoints more with the 
passage of time. The implication was that guilt at Time 2 would be more strongly 
associated with victim appraisals at Time 2 than they were at Time 1. Is there evidence 
Table 10 
Correlations Between Mean Perpetrator Guilt Ratings, Composite Appraisal Ratings, and Identity 
Claim Ratings as a Function of Responsibility Level, Nature of Relationship, and Time 
Perpetrator Victim Identity claim 
appraisal appraisal Identity claim "I want to be 
composite composite "l wish to be forgiven" treated better" 
Responsibility Relation- Guilt 
level ship rating Bivariate Semi" Bivariate Semi Bivariate Semi Bivariate Semi 
Angrily Int. Friend Time 1 .39* .40*.I -.10 -.14.1 .43* .42*.bl .24 .22b 
Time 2 .51 ** .37.1 .36 .08. 1 .71 *** 69*** 2 · ab .18 .02b 
Foreseeable Friend Time I .00 .04.2 .15 .16.2 .60** 55** I 
· ab -.39 -.29b 
Time2 .48* .43*/ .27 .18/ .54** 54** 2 
· ab -.08 .03b 
Angrily Int. Enemy Time I .51 * .51 *. .04 -.02a .17 .20ab3 -. 12 -. I Sb 
Time2 .72*** .69***. .20 .02a .65*** 64*** 3 
· ab .25 .23b 
Foreseeable Enemy Time I .46* .48*. .26 .29. .31 .36ab4 -.07 -.20b 
Time 2 .42 .41 *. .06 .03. .41 * .41 *.b4 .10 -.07b 
Note. *The semi-partial correlation coefficients indicate the association between guilt and the target variable (e.g., perpetrator appraisal) 
once the target variable's association with related variables (e.g., victim appraisal) has been removed. Across rows, cells sharing 
subscripts in common do not differ significantly. In columns, cells sharing superscripts in common do not differ significantly. 
*Q < .05, **Q < .01; ***Q < .00 I. 
°' 00 
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for this assertion? One can see in Table 10 that the guilt-victim appraisal association at 
Time 2 (Iic23 l = .08) is not statistically significantly different from the same association at 
Time 1 (r 1c2 3l = .14) There is thus no evidence for the assertion . It should be noted that 
the links between guilt and the perpetrators' own appraisals at Time 1 (Iic2.3l = .40) and at 
Time 2 (.37) are not statistically significant, although they are moderately strong in terms 
of practical significance. In point of fact, the link between perpetrators' own appraisals of 
responsibility and guilt is higher at Time 1 and Time 2 than the guilt-victim appraisal link 
in the angrily intended/friend condition, but the differences were not statistically 
significant. All things considered , there is little evidence in the angrily intended/friend 
condition that victim appraisals of responsibility play a more crucial role in guilt as time 
passes. 
The guilt-appraisal associations found in the foreseeable/friend condition were 
examined next. When the harm was foreseeable , the idea was that perpetrators as close 
friends of the victims would be motivated to adopt the victims' points of view_immediately 
after the harm occurred. This idea does not necessarily imply that the guilt-victim appraisal 
association will be statistically stronger than the guilt-perpetrator association at Time 1, 
however. It simply asserts that there should be a practically meaningful relationship 
between guilt and victim or perpetrator appraisals of responsibility at Time 1 in the case of 
foreseeable harm. Is there evidence supportive of these assertions? The results in Table 10 
show that neither of the associations (r 1c23 l =.16 and Iic23 > = .04, respectively) is 
statistically or practically significant! In contrast to the results in the angrily intended/ 
friend condition, the link between guilt and perpetrator appraisals tended to increase at 
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Time 2 (to r1<23 l = .43), whereas the link between victim appraisals and guilt tended to 
remain constant (to fi<23 ) = .18). The difference between guilt-perpetrator appraisal links 
and guilt-victim appraisal links at Time 1 did not differ significantly and it is noteworthy 
that the guilt-perpetrator appraisal association is much stronger in a practical sense than 
that for guilt and victim appraisals at Time 2 in the foreseeable condition. 
To summarize: There was little evidence that guilt directed toward friends was 
more strongly associated with victim appraisals at Time 2 than at Time 1 in both 
responsibility conditions, suggesting that the passage of time did not encourage greater 
focus on the victims' points of view. Moreover , ratings of guilty feelings toward their 
friends tended to be more highly associated with perpetrators' own estimates of their 
responsibility than with their victims' appraisals of responsibility (especially at Time 2) in 
both the angrily intended and foreseeable conditions , even after taking into account the 
variance shared between perpetrator and victim and appraisals of responsibility. 
Turning now to the enemy condition , it was argued that there would be no 
motivation for perpetrators to adopt their victims' perspectives at either level of 
responsibility or as a function of either time period . The general prediction in the enemy 
condition was, therefore , that guilt would be more strongly associated with perpetrator 
than with victim appraisals in all four of these cells. This general prediction was borne out , 
as seen in Table 10. It should be noted that (a) guilt ratings were positively associated , 
both statistically and practically speaking, with perpetrator responsibility appraisals in the 
four cells (Ii(2_3)s ranged from .41 to .69), but (b) guilt ratings were not associated, 
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statistically or practically speaking , with victim responsibility appraisals in the four cells 
(!:1(2_3)s ranged from -.02 to .29) . 
To close this section regarding guilt's association with appraisals , two conclusions 
are offered. First , it is possible to find a significant role for perpetrator responsibility 
appraisals in guilt. Finding evidence supportive of this role is possible even in conditions 
that should actually reduce that association (i.e., in close friendships; with the passage of 
time; in cases of foreseeable harm) . Second , there is little evidence to support the role of 
victims' perceived responsibility appraisals in guilt. Stated differently, although the 
victims' views may well play a role in guilt, little evidence was found for this role when it 
was operationalized as the victims' perceptions of the perpetrator s' responsibility. 
Correlational Analyses Regarding the 
Role ofldentity Claims in Guilt 
The goal in this section of the results is to consider the extent to which there were 
statistically and substantively significant associations between guilt and identity claims. It 
will be recalled that Chapters I and II of the dissertation focused on two different types of 
identity claims. The primary identity claim considered was that of "I wish to be forgiven" 
(hereinafter labeled "forgiveness"). The secondary identity claim assessed was that of "I 
want to be treated better " (hereinafter labeled "treat me better " ). Parkinson , the eminent 
interpersonal theorist , asserted that the communicative claim in guilt is a desire for 
forgiveness. In general , then, one should find positive associations between ratings of guilt 
and desires for forgiveness . Parkinson also views the identity claim of treat me better as 
the identity claim involved in anger (not in guilt). In fact, if anything, there generally 
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should be a negative association between the anger-related identity claim of treat me 
better and guilt, since guilt and anger, according to many, are antithetical. Results bearing 
on guilt-forgiveness and guilt-treat me better associations are presented below. 
Guilt-forgiveness associations: Nature ofrelationship. Is there any evidence 
supportive of Parkinson ' s view that ratings of guilt are associated positively with ratings 
of desires for forgiveness? By reexamining Table 9, it can be seen that the guilt-
forgiveness correlations were statistically and substantively significant in all four cells. 
Parkinson ' s assertion of a strong link between guilt and forgiveness is thus generally 
supported . 
It should be recalled further that the guilt-forgiveness association was expected to 
be especially strong in the friend compared to the enemy condition. After all, people 
presumably desire forgiveness more in closing, caring relationships than from people they 
hate! By referring again to the findings in Table 9, it can be seen that the association 
between guilt and forgiveness is indeed higher in the friend than in the enemy condition at 
Time I (r 1<23 ls = .50 vs .. 30) but this difference is not statistically significant. 
Interestingly , however , the guilt-forgiveness link is equally high in the friend and enemy 
condition at Time 2 (r 1<23 ls = .61 vs . .46). Thus , the need for forgiveness is associated 
with tendencies to express guilt later in time even toward people with whom one has an 
adversarial relationship. (Although this is generally supportive of Parkinson's expectations 
guilt-forgiveness associations , it presents an interesting conundrum regarding his 
interpersonal view of guilt, which will be addressed in the Discussion.) 
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Guilt-forgiveness: Nature ofrelationship, time, and responsibility. Beyond these 
general associations , more refined predictions regarding guilt-forgiveness associations 
were presented in Chapters I and II. A central prediction in this respect was that the guilt-
forgiveness link would be stronger at Time 1 in the friend condition when the event was 
foreseeable rather than angrily intended. The assumptions underlying this prediction were 
that (a) there would be a high need for a perpetrator to seek forgiveness, via expressions 
of guilt, in the foreseeable harm condition even immediately after the event occurred, since 
there was absolutely no justification for the harmful event produced via foreseeability, but 
(b) there would not be a need for the perpetrator to seek forgiveness, via guilty 
expressions , in the angrily intended condition at least immediately after the event 
transpired , since the perpetrator felt he had good justification for harming the victim. Do 
the correlational results presented in Table JO support either of these expectations? 
Examining the correlations between guilt and forgiveness at Time J reveals a 
stronger association in the foreseeable/friend condition (r 1c23 > = .55) than in the angrily 
intended/friend condition (Itc23 l = .42), although this difference was not statistically 
significant. Nonetheless , it is apparent that the guilt-forgiveness relationship is moderate 
even in the angrily intended friend condition at Time J. 
Another prediction regarding guilt-forgiveness associations was that their strength 
would actually reverse at Time 2 in the friend condition. That is, after time had passed , the 
expectation was that the guilt-forgiveness relationship in a friendship would actually be 
stronger in the angrily intended than in the foreseeable condition. The rationale for this 
reversal was that (a) there would be a greater need to ask for forgiveness, via guilty 
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expressions , in the angrily intended condition after time had passed because the time 
passage would allow anger to subside and the perpetrators to reconsider the importance of 
these friendships , and (b) there would be a lesser need to ask for forgiveness , again via the 
expression of guilt , in the foreseeable condition because this type of harm did not really 
threaten the relationship . Support was also found for this prediction, as seen in Table I 0. 
Specifically , the guilt-forgiveness correlation was higher in magnitude at Time 2 for the 
angrily intended/friend condition (r 1<2 3l = .69) than for the foreseeable/friend condition 
(r,c23 l = .54) , but this difference was not statistically significant. Note again, however , that 
both coefficients are substantial in magnitude in the two responsibility conditions . 
One final prediction concerning the expected associations of guilt with forgiveness 
pertains to the enemy condition. It will be recalled that no differential responsibilit y-
related associations were expected between guilt and forgiveness in this adversarial 
relationship . In general , it was simply expected that guilt would be associated less with 
forgiveness at Time I than at Time 2, because especiall y immediately in time the 
perpetrator is not concerned with preserving the relationship . Inspection of the 
coefficients in Table IO reveals some support for the validity of these expectations . In an 
absolute sense , the guilt-forgiveness association in the foreseeable/enemy condition was 
lower at Time 1 (L<23 l = .36 , ns) than at Time 2 (r 1<23 i = .41, .Q < .05) , but this difference 
was not statistically significant. The guilt-forgiveness link in the angrily intended/enemy 
condition shows a clearer difference between Time 1 (r 1(2 3l = .20, ns) and Time 2 
(r 1<2 3i = .64 , .Q < .00 I) , but this difference was not statistically significant. In all, then, 
although people who express greater guilt also tend to express greater desires for 
forgiveness, even toward people they dislike, it appears that guilty expressions toward 
one's enemies incorporate desires for forgiveness especially after time has passed. 
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In concluding this section, several assertions seem reasonable. First, there is a close 
connection between the tendency to see the self as feeling guilty and the desire to be 
forgiven. Second, however, the strength ofthis association varies (as predicted)-its 
magnitude increases or decreases with time as a function of one's responsibility and 
relationship with the victim. Third, and importantly, some of these results raise some 
interesting conundrums for Parkinson's interpersonal view of guilt which will be discussed 
in Chapter V (e.g., why would there be a significant guilt-forgiveness association in the 
enemy condition if guilt truly is meant to repair one's relationships)? 
Guilt-treat me better associations. Predictions were offered earlier regarding 
another identity claim discussed by Parkinson, that is, the so-called anger-based identity 
claim treat me better. The general idea was that ratings of this identity claim should be 
significantly negatively associated with ratings of guilt. After all, the desire in guilt is 
presumably to repair the broken interpersonal bridge between perpetrator and victim as 
opposed to damaging it even further by demanding reparative behavior on the victim's 
part. Was the association between guilt and treat me better a significant negative one in 
general? By reexamining Table 9, it can be seen that there is essentially little association 
between this identity claim and ratings of guilt across the four cells. 
A more specific prediction regarding the treat me better identity claim was that it 
should be most negatively associated with guilt in those conditions in which the 
perpetrator should be least concerned about the victim or the relationship. Specifically, 
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this link should be most negative in the friend condition for angrily intended harm at Time 
I compared to all other friend conditions . It can be seen from Table IO that this prediction 
was not supported. If anything, the negative relationship is strongest (r 1<2 3l = -.29) in the 
friendlforeseeableffime I condition. It was further expected that the guilt-treat me better 
association should be more negative in the friend conditions as a whole when compared to 
the enemy conditions as a whole. Examining the coefficients in either of Tables 9 or IO 
does not show support for this prediction. 
The final question asked regarding the identity claim of treat me better was 
whether it was associated less with ratings of guilty feelings than the identity claim so 
central to guilt (i.e., forgiveness). A comparison of the guilt-forgiveness versus guilt-treat 
me better associations revealed significant practical differences between the two 
correlation coefficients in almost all pertinent rows of Tables 9 and 10. That is, 
forgiveness was statistically significantly associated with guilt in all but the enemy 
conditions at Time 1, whereas treat me better was not statistically significantly associated 
with guilt in any condition . It is clear that guilt is more highly associated with forgiveness 
than the competing identity claim. 
In general , there was little support for the expected negative associations between 
guilt and the identity claim of treat me better. However , this section of the results does 
support the conclusion that guilt is much more strongly associated with the desire for 
forgiveness than the self-oriented, anger-related identity claim of treat me better. 
Correlational Analyses Relevant to the Relationship 
Between Responsibility Appraisals and Identity 
Claims in Perpetrator Guilt 
Thus far, the results have separately focused on the role of appraisal and the role 
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of identity claims in guilt. This section highlights results which are relevant to predictions 
outlined in Chapters I and II regarding the interactive roles of appraisal and identity claims 
in eliciting guilty feelings. The reader will recall that central to the thesis of this 
dissertation was the assumption (a) that a perpetrator's communicative agenda (i.e., 
identity claims) reflects the perpetrator's choice to attend to his or her own appraisals of 
responsibility versus those of his or her victim; and (b) that the nature of the relationship 
and perceptions of responsibility importantly affect whether this shift in perspective ever 
takes place as the event unfolds over time. For example, when perpetrators adopt the 
perspective of their friend victims, either early on, as in the case of foreseeable events, or 
later , as in the case of angrily intended events , they should experience a desire to 
communicate · a request for forgiveness. This section examines these assertions by 
considering additional results that shed light on the question of whether the 
communicative agenda of a perpetrator is reflected in his or her choice to attend to self or 
victim appraisals . These results are then followed by a review of previously reported 
results relevant to guilt-appraisal and guilt-identity claim links that when integrated , 
address the question of whether the anticipated pattern of association between identity 
claims, appraisals, and guilt is observed when taking into account relationship, 
responsibility level, and time. 
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Appraisal-identity claim links. This section is concerned with the hypothesis that a 
perpetrator's choice to express a particular identity claim reflects the degree to which the 
perpetrator attends to his or her own appraisals ofresponsibility or those of his or her 
victim. A relevant prediction in this respect addressed the degree to which identity claims 
communicated by a perpetrator are driven by the perpetrator's self-appraisals versus the 
victim's appraisals. Stated differently, is the communicative agenda of a perpetrator more 
highly associated \vith his or her own appraisals or those of his or her victim? One method 
of examining this assertion was to compare the degree to which guilt-related identity 
claims (i.e., forgiveness) were correlated with victims appraisals versus perpetrators' 
appraisals; and the degree to which anger-related identity claims were correlated with 
perpetrators' appraisals versus victims' appraisals . The expectation was that the 
correlation between forgiveness and victims' appraisals would be statistically significantly 
greater than the correlations between forgiveness and perpetrators' own appraisals. The 
corresponding prediction for anger-related identity claims was that one should find a 
significantly stronger association between anger-related identity claims and perpetrators' 
appraisals than between anger-related identity claims and victims' appraisals. 
The results pertaining to this analysis are shown in Table 8. The first observation is 
that victims' appraisals were not statistically nor meaningfully associated with forgiveness, 
either at Time 1 (! = .00, ns) or Time 2 (! = .03, ns). Interestingly, the association 
between perpetrator appraisals and forgiveness at Time 1 (! = .08, ns) and Time 2 
(! = .17, ns ), though not statistically nor meaningful significant, was greater in absolute 
terms than the association between victims' appraisals and forgiveness! Although 
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comparison of the forgiveness-perpetrator appraisal and forgiveness-victim appraisal links 
at Time 1 and Time 2 revealed no statistically significant differences, it is striking that 
forgiveness was more highly correlated with the perpetrators' than with the victims' 
appraisals of responsibility. 
With respect to anger-related identity claims, the association between perpetrators ' 
appraisals and anger-related identity claims was weak at best at both Time 1 and Time 2 
(I= .01, ns, and r = .14, ns, respectively). Even more interestingly, the association 
between victims' appraisals and anger-related identity claims was statistically and 
meaningfully significant at Time 1 (I= .23, Q < .05), though not statistically significant nor 
substantively meaningful at Time 2 (I= .19, ns)! The association between anger-related 
identity claims and either perpetrators' or victims' appraisals did not differ statistically 
significantly at either Time 1 or Time 2. 
Contrary to the primary thesis of this study, these findings suggest that there was 
little or no association between perpetrators' beliefs about how responsible their victims 
thought them to be and perpetrators' desires to communicate a request for forgiveness; 
but victims' appraisals were associated with perpetrators wanting their victims to treat 
them better . 
Another key prediction emphasized the relationship between guilt-related identity 
claims (i.e., forgiveness) and victims appraisals specifically. Rather than exploring this 
relationship directly, as in the results just presented, it was possible to examine the 
relationship between forgiveness and victims' appraisals by analyzing their respective 
relationships to a third variable, perpetrator guilt. This prediction stated that perpetrators' 
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need for forgiveness and victims' appraisals would equally predict the degree of guilt 
experienced by perpetrators. This assertion implies that forgiveness and victims' 
appraisals must co-occur. In other words, one would expect that requests for forgiveness 
would be present when perpetrators attend to their victims' appraisals but that they would 
not be present when perpetrators do not attend to their victims' appraisals. Thus, the 
expectation was for correlations between guilt and forgiveness and between guilt and 
victims' appraisals to each be statistically and practically significant but not statistically 
significantly different from each other. Moreover, this pattern of correlations was not 
expected to vary in any of the four responsibility level/nature of relationship conditions . 
So, for example, whether in situations where perpetrators would be expected to feel very 
guilty (as in the foreseeable/friend condition) or to feel little guilt (as in the angrily 
intended/enemy condition) , the expectation was for equally significant correlations 
between guilt and victims' appraisals and between guilt and forgiveness. 
The relevant correlation coefficients are shown in Table 10. Results indicate that 
whereas forgiveness was, with the exception of the Time 1 enemy conditions, statistically 
and meaningfully significantly associated with ratings of guilt at both Time 1 and Time 2, 
the association between guilt and victims' appraisals was low and not statistically nor 
meaningfully significant in any of the conditions at either Time 1 or Time 2. Comparing 
guilt-victim appraisal links to guilt-forgiveness links for all conditions revealed that guilt-
forgiveness links, though not statistically significantly different, were meaningfully greater 
than guilt-victim appraisal links in all conditions. Thus, the expectation of a consistently 
equal relationship between guilt and forgiveness or victims' appraisals was not supported. 
This result suggests that victims' appraisals and guilt-related identity claims do not share 
similar relationships with perpetrator guilt as hypothesized. 
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Integrating guilt-appraisals and guilt-forgiveness links. Results presented in 
previous sections separately addressed the links between guilt and appraisals and between 
guilt and identity claims. In this section, these previously reported results are integrated 
and summarized briefly to investigate the assertion that the degree to which perpetrators 
shift their perspective to attend to their own or their victims' appraisals and consequently 
assert a need for forgiveness (thereby feeling guilty) is largely determined by the 
relationship between the perpetrator and victim, the foreseeability or angrily intended 
character of the harm inflicted, and the passage of time. The predictions in this section 
were concerned with whether the anticipated pattern of guilt-appraisal links occurred 
concmTently with the anticipated pattern of guilt-forgi veness links across the four 
responsibility level/relationship conditions . Results from these analyses are presented first 
for the friend condition and then for the enemy condition. 
The prediction in the friend condition examined whether the selfs private 
appraisals (i.e., perpetrator appraisals) take precedence over identity claims or the victim' s 
appraisals when a person first responds emotionally to an event that was angrily intended. 
Recall that perpetrators who intentionally act to harm their victims would be expected to 
attend , at least initially, to their own personal motivation and justification for inflicting 
harm; and to not attend to their victims' beliefs about their responsibility. In not attending 
to the appraisals of their victims, perpetrators would not be expected to communicate a 
desire for forgiveness. Thus , in the case of harm that was angrily intended, the 
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expectation was that at Time 1, perpetrator guilt would be more highly correlated with 
perpetrator appraisals than with victim appraisals ; and concurrently , the link between guilt 
and forgiveness would not be statistically significant. With the passage of time, however , 
the guilt-perpetrator appraisal link would be expected to weaken, whereas the guilt-victim 
appraisal would be expected to strengthen; and concurrently , the link between guilt and 
forgiveness would be expected to become statistically significant at Time 2. 
As previously reported (see Table 9, cf. p. 65) , guilt was more highly correlated 
with perpetrator appraisals than with victim appraisals at Time 1, consistent with 
expectations . Contrary to expectations , however, the link between guilt and forgiveness 
was also found to be statistically significant. With the passage of time, the guilt-victim 
appraisal links were not observed to strengthen , nor were the guilt-perpetrator appraisal 
links shown to weaken as expected . Nevertheless , the guilt-forgiveness correlation was 
higher in magnitude at Time 2, as anticipated . 
The corresponding prediction in the case of foreseeable harm asserted that in these 
circumstances , perpetrators are likely to adopt their victims perspective from the outset 
and would therefore be expected to communicate a request for forgiveness early on. Thus 
the correlation between guilt and victim appraisals was expected to be statistically 
significant but not necessarily greater than the correlation between guilt and perpetrator 
appraisals at both Time 1 and Time 2; and concurrently , the link between guilt and 
forgiveness was expected to be statistically significant at Time 1 and weaken from Time 1 
to Time 2 because the nature of the harm did not present a fundamental risk to the 
relationship. 
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Integrating results previously reported reveals that the association between guilt 
and victims' appraisals at Time 1 was not statistically or practically significant, contrary to 
expectations . Nevertheless , the guilt-forgiveness link was statistically and substantively 
significant at Time 1. The guilt-forgiveness link was not observed to weaken from Time 1 
to Time 2 as expected. 
The integrative prediction with respect to harm in the enemy condition was that 
perpetrators would have little motivation to attend to the views of their victims early or 
later and would therefore have little desire to request forgiveness from them either. Thus 
the expectation was that guilt would be more strongly associated with perpetrators ' 
appraisals than with victim appraisals in both cases of foreseeable and angrily intended 
harm; and concurrently, that forgiveness would be less associated guilt. Results shown in 
Table 10 supported these assertions. Specifically, guilt-perpetrator appraisal links were 
significant in both the angrily intended and foreseeable conditions at Time 1 and Time 2, 
whereas guilt-victim appraisal links were not significant in any of the conditions. The guilt-
forgiveness links were also found to be relatively weaker in the enemy versus the friend 
condition , although the differences were not statistically significant. 
Taken together, these results provide mixed support for predictions regarding the 
patterns of guilt-appraisal and guilt-forgiveness that were expected to operate 
concurrently. Specifically, when the link between perpetrators' appraisals and guilt was 
significant and strong, guilt-forgiveness links also tended to be significant and strong. In 
conditions in which links between victim appraisals and guilt were expected to be high, but 
were not, the guilt- forgiveness links were nonetheless significant. 
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Summary of Results from Correlational Analyses 
Predictions that were originally presented in Chapters I and II were tested using 
semi-partial correlational analyses. Predictions asserted links between perpetrator guilt 
and perpetrators' own appraisals ofresponsibility , between perpetrator guilt and the 
responsibility appraisals of their victims , and between guilt and identity claims . 
Predictions also described the differential roles of appraisals and identity claims in guilt 
feelings when taking into account whether harm was foreseeable versus angrily intended , 
the nature of the relationship between perpetrator and victim, and the passage of time. 
Results relevant to the asserted links between appraisals and guilt did not support 
the study hypotheses . Results suggest that perpetrator appraisals , much more than victim 
appraisals , are related to guilty feelings, even in the conditions that should actually reduce 
the role of perpetrators ' appraisals. Whatever role victims ' appraisals play in guilt, it does 
not emerge when their perceived appraisals are assessed. Additionally , there was little 
evidence that the passage of time encouraged greater focus on the victims ' points of view. 
Results regarding the relationships between identity claims and perpetrator guilt 
provided mixed support for the relevant predictions . Results indicate that the tendency to 
see the self as feeling guilty is closely related to the desire to be forgiven. The strength of 
this association varies in magnitude as a function of one ' s sense ofresponsibility, the 
relationship with the victim, and the passage of time. There was little support for the 
expected negative associations between guilt and the identity claim of treat me better. 
Results do clearly support, however , the assertion that guilt is much more strongly 
associated with the desire for forgiveness than a self-oriented, anger-related identity claim. 
Importantly, some of the results relevant to guilt-identity claim links raised questions for 
Parkinson's interpersonal view of guilt and are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Finally, results pertaining to predictions about the relationship between appraisals , 
identity claims, and guilt feelings revealed that , contrary to expectations , there was little or 
no association between perpetrators' beliefs about how responsible their victims thought 
them to be and perpetrators' desires to communicate a request for forgiveness; nor did 
victims appraisals and guilt-related identity clain1S share similar relationships with 
perpetrator guilt as hypothesized. Mixed support was found for predictions regarding 
concurrent patterns of guilt-appraisal and guilt-forgiveness links. Specifically, strong guilt-
perpetrator appraisal links were accompanied by strong , rather than weak , guilt-
forgiveness links. In addition, the lack of significant guilt-victim links, even in the very 
conditions that should have encouraged them, did not preclude the guilt-forgiveness links 
from being significant. 
Analyses of Variance 
Thus far in the results section, attention has focused on relationships among 
participants' ratings of guilt , appraisal , and identity claims. In this section, attention is paid 
specifically to the extent to which guilt ratings differed reliably as a function of all 
manipulated variables. These mean differences in guilt are important to attend to in light of 
previous studies of guilty feelings and for comparison with the results of previous studies. 
It will be recalled that almost all previous studies of effects on perpetrators' guilty 
feelings presents them with vignettes in which their responsibility for a "hannful" outcome 
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varies after which they offer judgments of their responsibility and guilty reactions. Thus, 
these studies have looked at guilt and appraisal from the perspective of the perpetrator 
only. It will be further recalled that these studies are unclear in terms of whether the 
effects support an appraisal perspective and/or the interpersonal perspective. A part of the 
problem with the studies has been their failure to take into account the nature of the 
relationship between the involved parties and the effects of time. In this section of the 
analyses, these variables are taken into account, using them to test whether there is 
support for either the appraisal and/or the interpersonal view of guilt. Results are 
analyzed first from the perspective condition that best matches previous research-the 
perpetrator condition, ignoring the other two perspective conditions. Then, results bearing 
on the remaining two perspective conditions are presented . 
Predictions regarding guilty feelings in the perpetrator condition. The appraisal 
perspective leads one to expect that feelings of guilt should be affected by one 's depicted 
level ofresponsibility for the event in question. Using ANOVA, it should be possible to 
show that the objective (manipulated) nature of one's responsibility does impact how 
guilty one feels. This would be reflected in a main effect for manipulated responsibility 
level. Strong support for the appraisal perspective can be declared only if two results are 
obtained. First, there would only be a main effect of manipulated responsibility and 
second, the nature of that effect must be such that ratings of guilt are greater when the 
perpetrator's sense ofresponsibility cannot justify the perpetrator's harmful actions; in 
essence, the perpetrator must report greater feelings of guilt when his behavior was 
foreseeable (but unjustified) as opposed to angrily intended , because there is in his view 
justification for the angrily intended event but not for the foreseeable one. 
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The interpersonal perspective on guilt leads one to expect that guilty feelings 
depend heavily on the nature of one's relationships with the victim in question . People 
should report stronger feelings of guilt when they are in close, caring relationships than 
when they are in enemic ones (this is because guilt has a communicative function of asking 
for forgiveness and one wants forgiveness only in relationships that one cares about!). If 
this line of reasoning holds, one would expect to find a main effect of relationship on 
feelings of guilt. If one were to find only a main effect of relationship , this would be 
complete support for the interpersonal perspective . People simply feel guiltier when they 
hurt someone they care about than someone they hate. 
In reality, this study hypothesized that guilt feelings are much more complexly 
determined than either of the main effect predictions outlined above would lead one to 
think . Guilty feelings are interactively determined both by responsibility ( appraisal) and by 
interpersonal factors and by time. The bottom line expectation was that: objective 
responsibility ( appraisal) should make a bigger difference in the degree of guilty feelings 
reported in close , caring relationships but not in enemic ones. Thus , at the very least, a 
statistically significant Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship interaction was 
expected with differences in guilt between the angrily intended versus foreseeable 
condition being larger in the friend than in the enemy condition. On its own, this two-way 
interaction would support a combined appraisal-interpersonal view of guilt. Importantly, 
however, the expectation was for a three-way interaction among responsibility, 
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relationship, and time such that in close, caring relationships (i.e., friend condition) , people 
should feel less guilty for angrily intended than foreseeable events at Time I ; however , at 
Time 2 people in close, caring relationships should actually feel guiltier for angrily 
intended than for foreseeable events. In contrast , neither time nor responsibility were 
expected to affect ratings of guilt in the enemy condition . Given the expectation for a 
statistically significant three-way interaction among responsibility, relationship , and time 
for ratings of guilt, follow-up analyses in the from of a Responsibility Level x Time 
ANOV A of guilt were planned to be conducted separately in each relationship condition in 
order to break down the interaction . A statistically significant Responsibility Level x Time 
interaction was expected in the friend condition . The only potentially statistically 
significant result expected in the enemy condition was a main effect for time (with guilt 
declining across time). 
Results relevant to predictions regarding guilt in the perpetrator condition. To test 
these predictions , a 2 x 2 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship x Time) 
within-subjects ANO VA was conducted , treating participants ' ratings of the extent to 
which they perceived the perpetrator would feel guilty (I = Very Mildly ; 7= Extremely) at 
Time 1 and at Time 2 as the within-subjects factor. The results , shown in Table 11, 
revealed no statistically significant main effects and one statistically significant interaction 
of Responsibility Level x Time. 
The absence of main effects of responsibility level and nature of relationship was 
corroborated by the finding that the estimates of effect size associated with the 
responsibility level and nature of relationship factors were essentially zero, indicating that 
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Table 11 
Within-Subjects Analysis of Variance on Mean Perpetrator Guilt Ratings at Time 1 and 
Time 2 in the Perpetrator Condition 
Source df E Eta 2 
Between subjects effects 
Responsibility level (RL) 1 .001 .000 
Relationship (R) 1 .539 .006 
RLxR 1 .000 .000 
Within + Error 97 (7.186) 
Within subjects effects 
Time (T) .409 .004 
RLxT 10.341 ** .096 
RxT 1.094 .011 
RLxRxT 1 .306 .003 
Within + Error 97 (2.476) 
Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors . 
**12<.0I. 
none of the variability in guilt ratings was explained by variation in either responsibility 
level alone or nature of relationship alone . Recall that the presence of a statistically 
significant main effect of responsibility level was essential to the case in support of a 
uniquely appraisal view of guilt and that a main effect of nature of relationship would have 
been necessary to support a purely interpersonal view of guilt. 
Contrary to study predictions, the anticipated three-way interaction between 
Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship x Time was not statistically significant; 
neither was the Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship interaction found to be 
statistically significant. Indeed, both of these interactions were found to account for less 
than 1 % of the variability in guilt ratings. As reported previously , however , the 
Responsibility Level x Time interaction was statistically significant. The interaction is 
graphically depicted in Figure 4. 
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Review of the cell means underlying the Responsibility Level x Time interaction 
reveals that perpetrator guilt ratings in the angrily intended condition increased from Time 
1 (X = 4.08 , SD= 2.37) to Time 2 (X = 4.92, SD= 1.90), whereas in the foreseeable 
condition, guilt ratings decreased from Time 1 ( X = 4. 76, SD = 2.18) to Time 2 
( X = 4.20 , SD= 2.25) , irrespective of the nature of the relationship between perpetrator 
and victim. Analysis of the same interaction conducted separately in the friend and enemy 
conditions revealed that the Responsibility Level x Time interaction was stronger in the 
enemy condition, .E (I , 48) = 6.57, 2 = .014, than in the friend condition , .E (I , 49) = 3.85 , 
2 =.06 . In the enemy condition , mean guilt ratings increased from Time 1 (X = 3.75, 
SD= 2.25) to Time 2 (x = 4.96, SD= 1.76) in the angrily intended condition but 
decreased from Time 1 (X = 4.58, SD= 2.23) to Time 2 (X = 4.12, SD= 2.42) in the 
foreseeable condition. A similar pattern was revealed in the friend condition , such that 
mean guilt ratings increased from Time 1 ( X = 4.38, SD = 2.48) to Time 2 
( X = 4.88, SD = 2.07) in the angrily intended condition but decreased from Time 1 
( X = 4.96 , SD= 2.15) to Time 2 ( X = 4.28 , SD= 2.11) in the foreseeable condition. 
Estimates of effect size for the Responsibility Level x Time interaction for both the friend 
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Figure 4. Graphical representation of the Responsibility Level x Time interaction 
for mean guilt ratings in the perpetrator condition. 
was explained by the Responsibility Level x Time interaction in the enemy condition ( eta 
squared = .12) and somewhat less variability was explained by the same interaction in the 
friend condition (eta squared= .07). 
Predictions regarding the effects of perspective. In presenting the rationale for the 
study, it was hypothesized that perpetrators of angrily intended harm do not take the 
victim's point of view on the event until later in time, after the anger has subsided. 
Perpetrators of foreseeable harm were believed to adopt the victim's perspective more 
immediately after the event. This was the basis for expecting perpetrator guilt in the 
perpetrator condition-at least when they are good friends with the victim-to increase 
with time in the angrily intended condition but to decrease with time in the foreseeable 
92 
condition. The idea, then, was that those participants asked directly to adopt the victim' s 
point of view should produce a pattern of perpetrator guilt at Time 1 that resembled guilt 
in the perpetrator condition at Time 2 when they are friends. All things considered , then , 
2 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Time) ANOV As conducted on guilt in the friend condition 
should have resulted in a statistically significant Responsibility Level x Time interaction for 
those in the perpetrator condition, such that guilt increased with time for angrily intended 
events but decreased with time for foreseeable events. The same ANOV A conducted in 
the victim condition should have resulted in statistically significant main effects of 
responsibility level and of time in the victim condition, such that victims project 
perpetrators to feel guiltier at Time 1 than Time 2 and to feel guiltier for angrily intended 
than foreseeable events at both time periods . Because participants in the no-perspective 
condition were not provided with explicit instructions to adopt either the perpetrator or 
the victim' s perspective , these participants were in a position to more easily shift 
perspective from Time 1 to Time 2. It was anticipated that they would attend initially 
more to perpetrator motivation and later to the interpersonal nature of the harm inflicted. 
Conducting the same ANOVA in the no-perspective condition should have resulted in an 
even more significant Responsibility Level x Time interaction with a pattern of mean guilt 
ratings similar to those predicted in the perpetrator condition. 
Results pertaining to predictions about the effects of perspective . The first analysis 
pertaining to predictions regarding the effects of perspective was conducted and reported 
in the previous section. The reader will recall that when analyzed from the perspective of 
perpetrators, guilt increased with time in the angrily intended condition but decreased with 
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time in the foreseeable condition , consistent with expectations . When the victim condition 
was analyzed separately, the ANOV A resulted in a statistically significant main effect of 
responsibility level, E (1, 48) = 41.54 , 12 = .001, as anticipated. Mean guilt ratings in the 
foreseeable condition at Time 1 ( X = 5.15 , SD= 1.85) and Time 2 ( X = 4.39 , SD= 1.58) 
were statistically significantly greater than mean guilt ratings in the angrily intended 
condition at Time 1 (X = 3.29, SD= 1.83) and Time 2 (X = 3.67, SD= 1.71). An 
estimate of effect size for the main of effect of responsibility level revealed that a large 
proportion of the variability in guilt ratings (20%) was explained by variation in 
responsibility level alone. The main effect of time was not statistically significant, 
indicating that guilt did not decrease from Time 1 ( X = 4.22, SD= 2.05) to Time 2 
( X = 4.03 , SD= 1.67) to the extent predicted (eta squared= .01), but remained relatively 
high even at Time 2. Results in the no perspecti ve condition were also consistent with 
expectations. The Responsibility Level x Time interaction , graphically depicted in Figure 
5, was statistically significant, E (I , 51) = 18.60, 12 < .001, such that mean guilt ratings 
increased from Time 1 (X = 3.11 , SD= 2.15) to Time 2 (X = 5.04, SD= 1.93) in the 
angrily intended condition but decreased from Time 1 ( X = 4.69 , SD = 2.22) to Time 2 
( X = 3.73, SD= 2.59) in the foreseeable condition. Moreover , the magnitude of the 
effect, as estimated by eta squared , was much larger in the no-perspective (.27) than in the 
perpetrator condition (.07) as predicted. 
Summary of Results from ANOV As 
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Figure 5. Graphical representation of the Responsibility Level x Time interaction 
for mean guilt ratings in the no-perspective condition . 
perpetrator guilt was best explained by a purely appraisal view of guilt, by an interpersonal 
view, or by a interaction view in which appraisals and interpersonal concerns interact to 
affect guilty feelings. Analyses were initially conducted in the perpetrator condition that 
best aligns with previous research. Analyses were then conducted in the remaining two 
perspective conditions for purposes of comparison. Results relevant to the purely appraisal 
and uniquely interpersonal views of guilt revealed no support for either noninteractive 
view of guilt. That is, there was no main effect of responsibility level or of nature of 
relationship , nor were the estimates of effect size associated with the responsibility level 
and nature of relationship factors meaningful. Results relevant to the interaction view of 
guilt revealed only partial support for the hypothesized interactions . None of the expected 
interactions involving nature of relationship were statistically significant nor did they 
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account for more than 1 % of the variability in guilt ratings. Importantly, however, support 
for the interaction view of guilt did emerge in the form of a significant Responsibility 
Level x Time interaction such that guilt increased with time in the angrily intended 
condition but decreased with time in the foreseeable condition. This result was consistent 
with the hypothesis that perpetrators of angrily intended harm do not take the victim's 
point of view on the event initially but may later in time, whereas perpetrators of 
foreseeable harm adopt the victim ' s perspective soon after the event. 
To further examine the effects of shift in perspective, the effects of responsibility 
level and time in the perpetrator condition were compared to the same effects in the victim 
and no perspective conditions. Although there were no main effects for time , results 
supported the more important expectation for a main effect of responsibilit y level in the 
victim condition, such that mean guilt ratings in the foreseeable condition were statistically 
significantly greater than mean guilt ratings in the angrily intended condition at both Time 
1 and Time 2. Support also emerged for the expectation that in the no perspective 
condition, the Responsibility Level x Time interaction would be significant and stronger 
than the comparable interaction in the perpetrator condition. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Summary and Conclusions 
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As elaborated in Chapters I and II, the overarching purpose ofthis dissertation was 
to assess the relative validity of three competing views of the factors affecting feelings of 
guilt, that is., appraisal views, interpersonal views, and a new view of guilt, offered for the 
first time in this dissertation , that emphasizes the interactive role of appraisal and 
interpersonal influences on guilty feelings. It will be recalled that appraisal theories of 
guilt all emphasize the perpetrators ' feelings of responsibility in impacting how guilty they 
end up feeling for harming someone. From the appraisal perspective on guilt, any factor 
that increases the perpetrator ' s feelings ofresponsibility , should also increase their feelings 
of guilt. In terms of the data collected for this dissertation , two primary findings would 
have supported a uniquely appraisal-based account of guilty feelings. That is, guilty 
feelings should have thus been greatest when perpetrators viewed themselves as 
unjustified for causing harm, as in foreseeable as opposed to angrily intended acts , and 
there should have been significant associations between guilty feelings and the 
perpetrators' appraisals of their responsibility. The interpersonal approach to guilt, in 
contrast , focuses on the role that guilt plays in mending relationships because of the harm 
done and the threat it portends for the integrity of these bonds. Several primary 
predictions should have received statistical support to buttress the validity of the 
interpersonal approach to guilt. Specifically, validity of the interpersonal view of guilt 
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required finding that guilt varied systematically as a function of the nature of one ' s 
relationship with the victim; that guilt covaried substantially with the need for forgiveness; 
and that , whatever role that responsibility plays in increasing guilty feelings, it does so 
because the victim' s point of view on responsibility is adopted. Finally, to provide support 
for the interactive view of guilt , one needed to find that guilt did not vary simply as a 
function of either perpetrator appraisals alone or interpersonal concerns alone but as a 
function of an interaction between appraisal and interpersonal concerns . This interaction 
would have been such that guilty feelings would have varied as a function of shifts in 
perspective (from perpetrators ' views to those of victims) that were determined by 
perpetrators ' sense ofresponsibility , the relationship between perpetrators and victims , 
and the passage of time. 
These competing views of the factors influencing guilt were tested in two primary 
ways , as explained in Chapter III. First, an experimental design was implemented that 
incorporated independent variables meant to operationalize the appraisal , interpersonal , 
and interactive models of guilt. In this design , the perpetrators ' responsibility for the harm 
inflicted was varied, which was one way of operationalizing the appraisal theorists ' 
emphasis on responsibility precursors to guilty feelings. Also included in this design were 
factors meant to impact interpersonal concerns. That is, by varying the nature of the 
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, the communicative need to express 
(or even feel) guilt should have been impacted. The independent variables of the time at 
which guilt was assessed and the perpetrators' perspectives on the event were intended to 
operationalize the more interactive, appraisal, and interpersonal, view of guilt's origins. By 
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manipulating time, the intent was to allow for events to unfold such that perpetrators 
could attend to additional influences that they might not have attended to initially ( e.g., 
interpersonal concerns). By manipulating perspective , the intent was to compare guilt 
feelings as rated by perpetrators to ratings made by victims to determine whether 
perpetrators' guilt ratings later in time are similar to those of victims early on. Analyses 
were conducted primarily in the perpetrator condition as this was the only condition in 
which perpetrators' perceptions of their victims' appraisals were assessed. Second, in 
addition to the main dependent variable of feelings of guilt, other dependent variables were 
included that were needed to assess the validity of the three theories of guilt. Obviously, 
assessments of perpetrators ' appraisals ofresponsibility were included to measure the 
extent to which any validity was found for traditional appraisal theories of guilt. 
Assessments of the victims' appraisals of responsibility were included to measure the 
extent to which guilt experienced by a perpetrator is a function of how responsible 
perpetrators perceive their victims believe them to be. Measures of the need for 
forgiveness and the need to be treated better were included to assess the degree to which 
assertions about the role of interpersonal concerns could be supported. 
Using this design and these dependent measures allowed very specific predictions 
to be tested regarding each of the three views of guilt. Chapter IV of the dissertation 
presented in great detail the results bearing on each of these specific predictions. The best 
way of summarizing these results is as follows: What support was found for the appraisal 
view of guilt? This study demonstrated that perpetrators' appraisals do figure prominently 
in guilt, even in situations which, from an interpersonal view, would argue against a 
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significant role. Moreover, perpetrators' inferences about how responsible their victims 
viewed them appear to have little impact on the guilt perpetrators experience . Thus, 
perpetrators appeared to care far more about their own sense of responsibility than how 
responsible their victims thought them to be. Additionally, guilt ratings were observed to 
be higher when perpetrators viewed themselves as having less justification for their 
actions. What support was found for the interpersonal view of guilt? These results 
indicate that guilt is strongly associated with a need for forgiveness and that the degree to 
which perpetrators will experience this need is associated with the type of relationship 
shared with the victim. What support was found for the interactive view of guilt? The 
presence of support for both the appraisal and interpersonal views of guilt is, of itself, 
compelling evidence in support of an interactive view of guilt. Beyond this observation, 
however , were results that demonstrated that guilt does vary as a function of perpetrators' 
own appraisals of responsibility that change with time and the perspective taken on the 
events. Although the specific interaction between appraisals of responsibility, the nature 
of the relationship, and the perspective taken across time was not observed in this study, 
evidence did emerge to suggest that these factors do affect one another in important ways. 
In general, then, the results as a whole provide the best support for the interactive 
view of guilt. Although support for the appraisal view is strong, in order to back this view 
one would need to ignore other , important results that demonstrate that appraisals do not 
operate independently of the perspective taken on events or the nature of the relationship 
between individuals. To support the interpersonal view would require dismissing 
significant findings relevant to the central role of appraisals that emerged throughout the 
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results. Only a view that provides for both appraisals and interpersonal concerns in guilty 
feelings is sufficiently comprehensive to explain guilt. Although support for the specific 
interactive model set forth in this dissertation was not overwhelmingly favorable, results 
do argue, nonetheless, for an interactive view of guilt that allows for the operation of the 
appraisal and interpersonal factors emphasized in this study. 
Implications for Understanding Guilt 
Given that the best support was found for the interactive view, what are the 
implications of these findings for subsequent theory development and research (past and 
future) in the area of guilt? These results indicate that guilt cannot be readily explained in 
the manner that strictly appraisal or uniquely interpersonal accounts of guilt have implied. 
In particular , factors that have been found to play a role in guilt when investigated 
separately from the appraisal and the interpersonal view were found to have a role in guilt 
in this study. This finding requires explanation. One possible interpretation is that studies 
based on either view of guilt have focused only on those factors that mostly closely align 
with their respective views. Thus, each line of research , like the sages and the elephant , 
has been left to draw conclusions based on a limited view of the whole. A more holistic 
investigation of guilt would do well to take into account the influence of perspective and 
time, in addition to recognizing the important role of both appraisals and interpersonal 
concerns in guilt. In this regard, evidence in this study suggests that the roles with which 
individuals identify significantly impact their views about emotion. This makes intuitive 
sense but has been ignored in past research efforts that have relied on vignettes in order to 
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assess factors relevant to emotion but have failed to control for the perspective taken by 
participants. By controlling for perspective it might be possible to more clearly 
understand how shifts in perspective play a role in the elicitation of guilt. Although this 
study provides only limited direct evidence for shifts in perspective, indirect evidence does 
suggest that a process is operating to account for the interaction between a perpetrator's 
sense ofresponsibility and the passage of time to affect the perpetrator's feelings of guilt. 
For example, what occurs from the time a perpetrator first acts to intentionally inflict harm 
to impact the perpetrator's guilt response later? One possibility is that the perpetrator's 
anger merely subsides, allowing the person to attend to his or her own sense of 
responsibility. The finding that victims' appraisals did not figure prominently in the guilt 
of perpetrators would support that conclusion. However , an alternative explanation might 
be found in the influence of interpersonal concerns that operate independently of any 
attention that might or might not be paid to the victim's appraisals. After all, guilt was 
more highly associated with a desire for forgiveness after the passage of time when 
perpetrators acted in anger to intentionally harm their victims. Could it be that the passage 
of time does, in fact, allow perpetrators to attend to the impact of their behavior and that 
it is the need for forgiveness, prompted by a shift in perspective, that accounts for the 
increase in guilt? Although this study provides no definitive response, it does suggest that 
these questions merit further investigation. At the very least, one must conclude that guilt 
is a process that does evolve over time (Ferguson et al., 1997; Parkinson, 1999; Scherer, 
1999) and that investigations of guilt (and potentially other emotions) that are static in 
nature and do not attend to issues of perspective will fail to capture the complexity of the 
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event and risk misdiagnosing the true nature of the emotional episode. Future research 
must address these concerns or risk pursuing explanations of guilt that are too narrow to 
be generalizable to real-life situations. 
If researchers are to attend to both appraisals and interpersonal factors, as well as 
the effects of perspective and time, what implications do these :findings have on the 
respective roles of appraisal and interpersonal factors in guilt? Although Parkinson's 
(1995 , 1997) assertions about the role of identity claims in emotion have been largely 
untested , this study provides an initial test and does suggest that identity claims, at least in 
the case of the guilt-related identity claim of wanting forgiveness , do play an important 
role in guilt feelings. In fact, the significant role of the forgiveness identity claim extended 
even to those situations in which interpersonal views of guilt would have predicted no 
need for forgiveness. That is, forgiveness identity claims were highly associated with guilt 
even when the perpetrator and victim were enemies and there was little or no motivation 
to attend to the damage inflicted on the relationship! One possible explanation of this 
finding is that participants defaulted to choosing the forgiveness identity claim because 
other possible forced-choice responses on the dependent measure of identity claims did 
not accurately capture the communicative agenda ascribed to perpetrators. Nonetheless , 
requiring participants to choose from among the list of 13 separate identity claims included 
on the dependent measure of identity claims, derived directly from Parkinson's (1995, 
1 997) assertions regarding identity claims and successfully used in previous research 
(Treadwell, 1999), does not appear to fully explain this result. 
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The finding that forgiveness identity claims were associated with guilt even in 
enemic relationships might also be partially explained by the failure to control for the 
potentially varied responses of victims. It is possible that perpetrators experienced a need 
for forgiveness because they projected highly distressed responses to their victims, and 
that these severely distressed victim responses generated needs for forgiveness that 
overwhelmed any feelings of dislike for their enemies. Another potential explanation is 
that, as Parkinson has asserted ( 1997), the presence of forgiveness identity claims says as 
much about how the individual wishes to see him or herself as it does about the value the 
perpetrator places on the relationship. These findings can be interpreted to mean that 
perpetrators assert a need for forgiveness for reasons that go beyond concern for a 
relationship; that having harmed someone, they experience dissonance between their 
behavior and how the believe the ought to have behaved (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Higgins, 
Klein, & Strauman , 1985). Perpetrators thus may not only be concerned with mending a 
damaged relationship , but also with mending their own image of themselves. By 
communicating a need for forgiveness, the perpetrator is thus able to reassure him or 
herself that he or she is not such a bad person after all. This line of reasoning would be 
consistent with the finding that perpetrators' views of how responsible victims thought 
them to be did not play a role in how guilty perpetrators felt. Parkinson has asserted that 
appraisals really do not play a causal role at all in emotions, that it is the need to 
communicate a wish for forgiveness that elicits the guilt response. If, in fact, my need for 
forgiveness is more about maintaining a particular image of myself, then what my victims 
think about me may have very little relevance. Thus, it is possible that forgiveness identity 
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claims do reflect a need to restore a damaged relationship , but in addition, they serve to 
restore one's image of oneself as a good person . 
Of course , the observation that people may have asked for forgiveness because 
they were just as concerned about their own self-image as they were about their 
relationships, raises some interesting issues that need to be considered by researchers in 
this area. The main issue is whether requests for ratings of guilt are uncontaminated from 
other emotions . That is, when rating guilt (and its supposed uniquely associated identity 
claim of "forgiveness "), were the participants rating guilt and guilt alone? Could it be that 
they were also implicitly rating how ashamed they felt? Shame is, after all, supposedly 
driven by concerns with one ' s self-image (Ferguson et al., 2000; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 
1995). That is, shame is said to arise when individuals see themselves as falling short of 
their ideal selves. It is possible that measures designed to assess guilt and the guilt-related 
identity claim of forgiveness actually tapped participants ' ratings of perpetrators' 
unwanted views of themselves, particularly considering the abundant evidence that 
measures of shame and guilt are correlated (Ferguson & Crowley, 1997; Harder & Zalma, 
1990; Lindsay-Hartz , deRivera, & Mascolo , 1995). Data collected during the course of 
this study, not directly relevant to this study's hypotheses , sheds light on this question . 
Specifically, the correlation between guilt and the shame-related identity claim, "I am a 
bad person, " taking into account the correlation between shame and the same identity 
claim, was found to range from zero to very low (I 1c2 3i = .07) across the four responsibility 
level/nature ofrelationship conditions. The correlation between forgiveness and ratings of 
shame, taking into account the relationship between guilt and forgiveness, ranged from 
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zero to moderate across the four responsibility level/nature of relationship conditions 
(I 1c2 3> = .01 to .31 ). Finally, the correlation between the guilt-related forgiveness identity 
claim and the shame-related identity claim of"I am a bad person ," talcing into account the 
association between guilt and forgiveness, was moderate to high across the four 
responsibility level/relationship(r 1c23 > = .16 to .54). Taken together , these results suggest 
that strong guilt-forgiveness links cannot be entirely explained by the possibility that in 
addition to rating how guilty they felt, participants rated how ashamed they felt. Rather , 
these results indicate that the links between guilt and forgiveness were strong in spite of 
the association between ratings of guilt and shame. 
Limitations 
Finally, are there any limitations to the study that would urge caution ? The 
primary concern in all investigations into the antecedents of emotion is whether results are 
generalizable to real-life emotion experiences . In this regard , it is important to 
acknowledge design characteristics of the present study that may place limits on external 
validity. The first consideration is whether simply telling participants to adopt the identity 
of a friend or an enemy allows participants to respond as if they really were a friend or 
enemy. People generally like to think of themselves as likeable and may struggle to 
imagine themselves interacting with someone whom they dislike and who dislikes them. 
When participants are not able to truly adopt this role, regardless of whether they 
recognize that the assigned relationship is enemic or amicable, the effects of relationship 
may be lost. This may explain why the nature of relationship factor as operationalized in 
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this study was not a significant factor in any of the predicted interactions involving 
responsibilty level, perspective, nature of relationship, and time. One way of overcoming 
this challenge might be to encourage participants to come up with real experiences from 
their own lives and to identify individuals with whom they share positive and negative 
relationships. Using these real relationships, participants could participate in experiments 
that seek to understand factors that contribute to emotion. 
A similar question arises regarding the ability of participants to adopt the 
perspective of perpetrators or victims. Although checks on the manipulation of 
perspective indicated that participants were able to accurately identify the role to which 
they were assigned and did not differ with respect to the degree to which they were able to 
identify with their assigned role, these measures tapped only the degree to which 
participants were able to cognitively adopt the assigned perspective. The question 
remains as to whether participants were able to experientially adopt either the perpetrator 
or victim perspective. One could expect that the findings observed in this study with 
respect to perspective shifts would be even more significant were participants able to more 
fully adopt their assigned roles. 
An associated problem of external validity, that may also limit a study's ability to 
distinguish between factors that are central to emotion and those that are epi-phenomenal , 
arises when studies rely exclusively on individuals' reports of events. Relying on 
participant report is problematic because people are not always aware of what is really 
driving their emotional responses. Thus, relying on self-reports to measure appraisals, 
identity claims, or other variables may fail to capture processes that may actually be 
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involved but that operate outside the conscious awareness of participants (Duck, 1991; 
Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Schorr , 2001). One potential strategy for addressing these 
concerns would be to conduct observational studies, perhaps along the lines of those 
conducted by Gottman and colleagues (e.g. Gottman, 1998) in which people's emotional 
experiences are recorded and later reviewed to understand the factors to which they were 
attending, and importantly those to which they were not attending, during the unfolding of 
the experience. This recommendation notwithstanding, it is obvious that finding 
appropriate methodologies to assess the antecedents of complex emotions , like guilt, 
remains a challenge for researchers. 
Another source of limitation on the applicability of these findings arises from this 
study's reliance on assessing perpetrators' perceptions of how responsible their victims 
believed them to be. If the accuracy of one's self-reports about one's own behavior is 
suspect, then what can one say about the accuracy of relying on what someone perceives 
someone else is thinking? This raises an important question for research that attempts to 
explore how people ' s thoughts (e.g., appraisals) and feelings (e.g. , guilt) may be related to 
what others think about them. The support for Parkinson's theory (1997) that emerged in 
this study might be difficult to replicate were it possible to accurately assess the appraisals 
made by victims and the degree to which those appraisals impacted the emotional response 
of perpetrators. 
Another series of questions that remain unanswered by this study is whether and 
how gender and relational factors interact to impact the emotion aroused. Due to its 
exploratory nature, this study did not investigate gender effects in terms of men's and 
108 
women's perceptions of the events depicted. Future research that relies on portrayals of 
emotion must consider not just the gender of participants but also the congruence between 
the gender of participants and the gender of actors . Gender is a crucial variable to explore 
especially when emotion is conceptualized in relational terms (Brody, 1997; Brody & Hall, 
1993). Obviously, people have different relational goals in many same-sex versus 
opposite-sex interactions that are capable of significantly influencing the identity claims 
they wish to express with their emotions. 
One question that may be asked regarding the applicability of these results reflects 
concerns about the population from which participants were recruited and whether that 
population may differ from the larger population to which these results may be applied. It 
is true that a majority of the population from which the sample was drawn are affiliated 
with the LDS church and that potentially a majority of participants in the study are or have 
been affiliated with the LDS church in some way. However , data have yet to emerge to 
suggest that the experience of guilt is any different for those who professes a particular 
religious or spiritual belief. On the contrary , researchers investigating guilt-proneness 
relying on samples involving disproportionately large numbers of LDS church members 
have not reported differences in guilt-proneness attributable to religious affiliation when 
comparing results to research conducted with samples that were not predominantly LDS 
(e.g., Ferguson & Crowley, 1997). In spite ofresearch that suggests that there is little 
evidence to suggest that the results reported here may be ungeneralizable due to the 
somewhat unique population from which the research sample was drawn, it is nonetheless 
important to recognize that LDS religious doctrine, like that of many faiths, specfically 
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encourages adherents to forgive others, even one's enemies. Thus, it is possible that the 
results of this study may have been influenced by a culture that encourages victims to 
forgive their perpetrators regardless of the nature of the relationship between perpetrators 
and victims. Future research into the role of forgiveness identity claims will need to take 
religious and cultural differences into account and would do well to replicate these 
findings in varied religious and cultural settings. 
Other factors, not specifically addressed in this study, may also potentially affect 
the relationship between responsibility appraisals, perspective, nature of relationship, and 
time in feelings of guilt. For example, a recent study found that the degree to which 
individuals sought forgiveness was a function of variability in the degree to which they 
were able to take the perspective of their victims due to the influence of self-monitoring 
(Sandage, Worthington, Hight, & Berry, 2000). It is possible that high self-monitoring 
perpetrators might attend more to the appraisals of their victims relative to those who are 
less inclined to self-monitor and therefore experience a greater need to seek forgiveness. 
On the other hand, Sandage et al. speculated that those who engage in a high degree of 
self-monitoring were less likely to seek forgiveness because self-monitoring, which is an 
effort to maintain one's social impression "interfere[s] with perspective-ta.king and 
impair[ s] empathy" ( emphasis added, p. 30). In addition to self-monitoring, individual 
differences have been shown to affect perspective taking and forgiveness seeking. 
Researchers have noted links between empathy and forgiveness seeking (McCullough et 
al., 1998) and between personality traits and forgiveness seeking (Gramzow & Tangney, 
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1992). These factors should be explored for their contribution to the integrated view of 
guilt presented in this study . 
Finally, in addition to this study ' s efforts to understand guilt , future research must 
also broaden its scope to investigate how the factors highlighted here may operate to 
affect other emotions , both positive and negative. 
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Scenarios and Instructions Used to Operationalize Independent Variables 
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Scenario 1 : A Day at the Ceramics Lab 
Foreseeable /Perpetrator /Friend Condition: 
(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions , please read the scenario that 
follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who hurts someone or causes damage . Try to 
imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say 
before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl 
into this person's "skin" as though you are actually acting out the entire event as 
though you were the person who caused the damage and really identify with being 
this person. 
(Scenario:) YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several 
hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day 
while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water 
around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away 
from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue . The statue is 
in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past 
four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse . Liz is in 
shock, staring at the remains of her spouse ' s gift. 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Enemy Condition : 
(Instructions :) When you have read these instructions , please read the scenario that 
follows. While you are reading this scenario , we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who causes damage . Try to imagine everything 
that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event 
took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person's 
"skin" as though you are actually acting out the entire event as though you were 
the person who caused the damage and really identify with being this person. 
(Scenario:) YOU and Liz have been enemies for many years. YOU can't stand her . 
YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you go to 
great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics lab, 
YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it 
up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, 
dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize 
the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as 
an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her 
spouse's gift. 
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Foreseeable / Victim/Friend Condition: 
(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions , please read the scenario that 
follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try 
to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or 
say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to 
crawl into this person's "skin" as though you were actually acting out the entire 
event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged 
and really identify with being this person. 
(Scenario :) YOU and Sandy have been friends for many years. You spend several 
hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day 
while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and spills some water 
around the sink. Sandy does NOT clean it up. Soon after, YOU are walking by the 
sink and slip, dropping YOUR newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. 
YOUR statue is the one YOU have spent the past four months meticulously 
sculpting as an anniversary gift for YOUR spouse. YOU are in shock, staring at 
the remains of YOUR spouse ' s gift. 
Foreseeable / Victim/Enemy Condition: 
(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that 
follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try 
to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or 
say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to 
crawl into this person's "skin" as though you were actually acting out the entire 
event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged 
and really identify with being this person. 
(Scenario:) YOU and Sandy have been enemies for many years. YOU can' t stand 
her. YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you 
go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics 
lab, Sandy is cleaning up and spills some water around the sink. Sandy does NOT 
clean it up. Soon after, YOU are walking by the sink and slip, dropping YOUR 
newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOUR statue is the one YOU 
have spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for 
YOUR spouse. YOU are in shock, staring at the remains of YOUR spouse's gift. 
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Foreseeable /No Perspective/Friend Condition: 
(Instructions:) Please read the following scenario. 
(Scenario:) Sandy and Liz have been friends for many years. The two spend 
several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. 
One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and spills some 
water around the sink. Sandy does NOT clean it up. Soon after , Liz is walking by 
the sink and slips, dropping her newly fired statue . The statue is in a million pieces. 
Liz has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an 
anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her 
spouse's gift. 
Foreseeable /No Perspective /Enemy Condition: 
(Instructions:) Please read the following scenario. 
(Scenario:) Sandy and Liz have been enemies for many years. The two can't stand 
each other. They consider each other to be number one on their respective lists of 
enemies. The two go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working 
at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and spills some water around the sink. 
Sandy does NOT clean it up. Soon after , Liz is walking by the sink and slips, 
dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. Liz has spent the 
past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for her 
spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse's gift. 
Angrily Intended/Perpetrator /Friend Condition: 
(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that 
follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who causes damage. Try to imagine everything 
that this person was thinking , feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event 
took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person's 
"skin" as though you are actually acting out the entire event as though you were 
the person who caused the damage and really identify with being this person. 
(Scenario:) YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several 
hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day 
while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and are standing by the 
sink. Liz approaches and starts yelling at YOU for something she believes YOU 
did. She is in YOUR face, yelling, and accusing YOU of terrible things. Liz holds 
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in her hands a statue she has been working on. As she turns to walk away YOU 
stick out YOUR elbow to hit her statue. The statue falls from her hands and onto 
the floor. It breaks into a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one Liz 
has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her 
spouse. Liz is in shock , staring at the remains of her spouse ' s gift. 
Angrily Intended/Perpetrator /Enemy Condition : 
(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions , please read the scenario that 
follows . While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who causes damage. Try to imagine everything 
that this person was thinking , feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event 
took place and while it was unfolding . You should try to crawl into this person's 
"skin" as though you are actually acting out the entire event as though you were 
the person who caused the damage and really identify with being this person. 
(Scenario:) YOU and Liz have been enemies for many years. YOU can't stand her. 
YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you go to 
great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics lab, 
YOU are cleaning up and are standing by the sink. Liz approaches and starts 
yelling at YOU for something she believes YOU did. She is in YOUR face, 
yelling, and accusing YOU of terrible things. Liz holds in her hands a statue she 
has been working on . As she turns to walk away YOU stick out YOUR elbow to 
hit her statue . The statue falls from her hands and onto the floor. It breaks into a 
million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one Liz has spent the past four 
months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse . Liz is in 
shock , staring at the remains of her spouse ' s gift 
Angrily Intended/Victim/Friend Condition : 
(Instructions :) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that 
follows. While you are reading this scenario , we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged . Try 
to imagine everything that this person was thinking , feeling, and wanting to do or 
say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to 
crawl into this person's "skin" as though you were actually acting out the entire 
event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged 
and really identify with being this person. 
(Scenario:) YOU and Sandy have been friends for many years. You spend several 
hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day 
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while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and is standing by the sink. 
YOU approach Sandy and start yelling at her for something YOU think she did. 
YOU are in her face, yelling, and accusing her terrible things. YOU hold in YOUR 
hands a statue that YOU have been working on. As YOU turn to walk away, 
YOU see Sandy stick out her elbow to hit YOUR statue. It falls from YOUR 
hands and onto the floor. The statue breaks into a million pieces. YOU have spent 
the past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for 
your spouse. YOU are in shock, staring at the remains of YOUR spouse's gift. 
Angrily Intended/Victim /Enemy Condition: 
(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that 
follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try 
to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or 
say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to 
crawl into this person's "skin" as though you were actually acting out the entire 
event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged 
and really identify with being this person. 
(Scenario:) YOU and Sandy have been enemies for many years . YOU can't stand 
her. YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you 
go to great length5 to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics 
lab, Sandy is cleaning up and is standing by the sink. YOU approach Sandy and 
start yelling at her for something YOU think she did. YOU are in her face, yelling, 
and accusing her of terrible things. YOU hold in YOUR hands a statue that YOU 
have been working on. As YOU turn to walk away, YOU see Sandy stick out her 
elbow to hit YOUR statue. It falls from YOUR hands and onto the floor. The 
statue breaks into a million pieces . YOU have spent the past four months 
meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for your spouse. YOU are 
in shock, staring at the remains of YOUR spouse 's gift. 
Angrily Intended/No Perspective /Friend Condition: 
(Instructions:) Please read the following scenario. 
(Scenario:) Sandy and Liz have been friends for many years. The two spend 
several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. 
One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and is standing by 
the sink. Liz approaches Sandy and starts yelling at her for something she thinks 
Sandy did. Liz is in her face, yelling, and accusing her of terrible things. Liz holds 
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in her hands a statue that she has been working on. As Liz turns to walk away , 
Sandy sticks out her elbow to hit Liz's statue . It falls from Liz's hands and onto 
the floor. The statue breaks into a million pieces. Liz has spent the past four 
months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz 
is in shock , staring at the remains of her spouse's gift. 
Angrily Intended/No Perspective/Enemy Condition: 
(Instructions:) Please read the following scenario. 
(Scenario :) Sandy and Liz have been enemies for many years. The two can't stand 
each other . They consider each other to be number one on their respective lists of 
enemies . The two go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working 
at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and is standing by the sink. Liz 
approaches Sandy and starts yelling at her for something she thinks Sandy did. Liz 
is in her face , yelling , and accusing her of terrible things . Liz holds in her hands a 
statue that she has been working on . As Liz turns to walk away , Sandy sticks out 
her elbow to hit Liz ' s statue . It falls from Liz's hands and onto the floor . The 
statue breaks into a million pieces. Liz has spent the past four months meticulously 
sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for her spouse . Liz is in shock , staring at 
the remains of her spouse ' s gift. 
Scenario 2: The Dinner Party 
e.g., Foreseeable/ Victim/Enemy Condition : 
(Instructions :) When you have read these instructions , please read the scenario that 
follows . While you are reading this scenario , we would like you to try your hardest 
to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try 
to imagine everything that this person was thinking , feeling , and wanting to do or 
say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to 
crawl into this person's "skin" as though you were actually acting out the entire 
event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged 
and really identify with being this person. 
(Scenario:) YOU and Sarah have been enemies for many years . YOU can't stand 
her. YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies . The two of you 
go to great lengths to avoid one another . One evening, YOU and Sandy find 
yourselves at the same dinner party. Later in the evening , near the buffet table, 
YOU become aware that Sandy is standing directly behind YOU, with her back to 
YOU. Just then, YOUR very attractive friend walks up to join YOU. As YOU 
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and your friend reach out to take each other's hands, Sarah explodes into laughter. 
This startles YOU and YOU flinch, spilling YOUR drink and food. YOU look 
down at your clothes and find them thoroughly stained. 
Scenario 3: A Night at the Movie Theater 
e.g., Angrily Intended/No perspective /Friend Condition: 
(Instructions:) Please read the following story. 
(Scenario:) Jeff and Casey have been friends for many years. The two spend 
several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. 
One day Jeff asks a friend to accompany him to view a new movie playing at a 
local theater. Independently of Jeff, Casey, also decides to go to the theater with 
several of his friends. Throughout the movie Casey and his friends are laughing and 
making distracting noise. Jeff repeatedly leans forward to tell them to be quiet. 
Casey and his friends continue to make noise and tell Jeff to "shut up." About 
half-way through the movie, Casey leaves the theater to get some drinks for 
himself and his friends , passing Jeff on his way out. As Casey returns with the 
drinks , Jeff sticks his leg out into the aisle. Casey trips over Jeff's leg, falls to the 
ground and the drinks go everywhere. 
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Appendix B: 
Manipulation Control Questionnaire 
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Some Questions about You and the Story You Read 
Please answer the following questions concerning the story you read. Circle the number 
that you believe is the best answer or respond in the space provided. 
I. Where did the event take place? 
a. in a movie theater 
b. at a grocery store 
c. in a ceramics studio 
d. at a dinner party 
e. I don't remember 












3. Did the story describe how someone experienced harm? 
If yes, please elaborate what the story said about this: 
4. Did the story describe how the harm came about? 
If yes, please elaborate what the story said about this. 
5. What is your age? 
6. Are you male or female? (Circle one) 
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7. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. 
What did "you" do in the story? 





5. I don't remember 
9. Outside of this particular incident, how much would you say that the two people 
generally like each other? 
1 
I 
Not at all 
2 
10. What is your major? 
3 




5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
12. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. 
Who were you? 
13. How successful were you at putting yourself in the shoes of the person you were 
asked to identify with? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I I I 
Not at all Somewhat to a great extent 





5. the time of day was not specified. 















Sample Time 1 and Time 2 Appraisal Rating Forms 
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Appraisal Rating Form: Perpetrators Self Appraisals 
Time 1 Example 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition-Ceramics Studio Scenario: 
Part A 
For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the 
story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow. 
YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week 
together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working 
at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. 
YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz 
walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million 
pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months 
meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse . Liz is in shock, staring 
at the remains of her spouse's gift. 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED 
YOUR FRIEND'S STATUE. 
I. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then , to what degree 
did you believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided? 
2 3 




5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
2. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree 
did you believe the breaking of the statue was intentional? 
I 
I 
Not at all 
2 3 4 
I 
Somewhat 
5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
3. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, how justified did 
you feel in having broken the statue? 
1 
I 
Not at all 
2 3 4 
I 
Somewhat 
5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
Appraisal Rating Form: Perpetrators Self Appraisals 
Time 2 Example 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition-Ceramics Studio Scenario: 
Part A 
Review: You were working in a ceramics studio with your friend, Liz. 
YOU noticed that you left water on the floor. Liz passed by, slipped on 
some water, and dropped her statue. Liz's statue was destroyed. 
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FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU DESTROYED YOUR 
FRIEND'S STATUE YESTERDAY. 
I. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree do you 
believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided? 
2 3 




5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
2. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree do you 
believe the breaking of the statue was intentional? 
2 3 




5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
3. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, how justified were you in 
breaking the statue? 
2 3 




5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
Appraisal Rating Form: Perpetrators Perceptions of Victims Appraisals 
Time 1 Example 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition-Ceramics Studio Scenario: 
Part D 
For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the 
story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow. 
135 
YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together 
and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics 
lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. 
Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her 
newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one 
LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her 
spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse's gift. 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED 
YOUR FRIEND'S STATUE. 
Now that you have read the story and understand what you did and how you 
harmed someone , please think about how LIZ, the person you have harmed, thinks 
about what you did. Try to really imagine how LIZ is responding to what you did 
and try to understand what she is thinking about your behavior. Keeping LIZ's 
thoughts in mind, please respond to the next three questions . 
1. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ 








5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
2. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ 
(not you) believe the breaking of the statue was intentional? 
1 
I 
Not at all 
2 3 4 
I 
Somewhat 




3. It is immediately after the statue was broken . Right then, to what degree does LIZ 
(not you) believe you were justified in breaking the statue? 
1 
I 
Not at all 
2 3 4 
I 
Somewhat 
5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
Appraisal Rating Form: Perpetrators Perceptions of Victims Appraisals 
Time I Example 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition-Ceramics Studio Scenario: 
Part D 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ'S STATUE WAS 
DESTROYED YESTERDAY. 
Think back to yesterday and what you did to harm someone. Please think about 
how LIZ, the person you have harmed, thinks about what you did now, one day 
later. Try to really imagine how LIZ is responding to what you did yesterday and 
try to understand what she is thinking about your behavior now. Keeping LIZ's 
thoughts in mind, please respond to the next three questions. 
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1. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now , to what degree does LIZ (not you) 








5 6 7 
I 
Very much 
2. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does LIZ (not you) 
believe the breaking of the statue was intentional? 
I 
I 
Not at all 







3. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now , to what degree does LIZ (not you) 
believe you were justified in breaking the statue? 
I 
I 
Not at all 
2 3 4 
I 
Somewhat 





Sample Time I and Time 2 Emotional Response Rating Forms 
Emotional Response Rating Form 
Time 1 Example 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition-Ceramics Studio Scenario: 
PartB 
For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the 
story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow. 
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YOU and Liz have been friends for many years . You spend several hours a week together 
and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics 
lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. 
Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her 
newly fired statue . The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one 
LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her 
spouse. Liz is in shock , staring at the remains of her spouse ' s gift. 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED 










Think back to the story you just read. Indicate the degree to which YOU are 
feeling each of the following emotions immediately after the statue was broken . 
Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU are experiencing each 
emotion. For example , if YOU are feeling very mildly angry , circle the number I. 
If YOU are not feeling a particular emotion at all, circle zero . 
Very Mildly Moderately Extremely 
I I I 
Angry 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Pity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilty 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Afraid 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ashamed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sad 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Embarrassed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proud 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Let's think about how guilty YOU felt immediately after the statue was 
broken. Why was this your immediate feeling? 
Emotional Response Rating Form 
Time 2 Example 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition-Ceramics Studio Scenario: 
PartB 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ's STATUE WAS 
DESTROYED YESTERDAY. 
Indicate the degree to which YOU are feeling each of the following emotions one day 
after the statue was broken. Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU are 
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experiencing each emotion. For example, if YOU are feeling very mildly angry, circle the 
number 1. If YOU are not feeling a particular emotion at all, circle zero. 
Very Mildly Moderately Extremely 
I I I 
1. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Pity 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Guilty 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Afraid 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Ashamed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Sad 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Embarrassed O I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Proud 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I 0. Let's think about how guilty YOU feel one day after the statue was broken . 
Why is this YOUR feeling now? 
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Appendix E: 
Sample Time 1 and Time 2 Identity Claims Rating Forms 
Identity Claims Rating Form 
Time 1 Example 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition-Ceramics Scenario: 
Part C 
For your convenience , the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the 
story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow . 
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YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together 
and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics 
lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. 
Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her 
newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one 
LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her 
spouse . Liz is in shock , staring at the remains of her spouse's gift. 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED 
YOUR FRIEND'S STATUE. 
Think back to the story you just read. Indicate the degree to which YOU were trying to 
communicate each of the following messages. Circle the number corresponding to the 
degree YOU wished to communicate each message. For example , if YOU were 
communicating a very mild message of "respect me" to Liz, circle the number 1. If you 
think a specific message was not being communicated at all, circle zero. 
It is immediately after the vase was broken . Right then , I was communicating that. .. 
Very Mildly Moderately Extremely 
I I I 
1 I deserved to be respected 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I care for you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I wish to be forgiven 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I want to be treated better 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I'm better than you 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am inadequate 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I don ' t want to be hurt 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Look up to me 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I submit to you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I don 't hurt me again 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I'm a bad person 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I need help 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I need you to comfort me 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I want you to recognize me O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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15. I 'm glad I'm not you O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Let's think about how guilty you felt immediately after the statue was broken ... .In 
feeling this amount of immediate guilt, what were you communicating? 
Identity Claims Rating Form 
Time 1 Example 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition-Ceramics Scenario: 
PartC 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ'S STATUE WAS 
DESTROYED YESTERDAY. 
If Liz happened to be with YOU today, what would YOUR feelings today be 
communicating? Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU would be 
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communicating each message. For example, if YOU would be communicating a very mild 
message of "respect me" to Liz, circle the number 1. If you think a specific message would 
not be communicated at all, circle zero. 
It is one day after the vase was broken. If Liz happened to be with YOU, YOUR feelings 
would be communicating that ... 
Very Mildly Moderately Extremely 
I I I 
1 I deserved to be respected 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I care for you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I wish to be forgiven 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I want to be treated better 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I'm better than you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am inadequate 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I don't want to be hurt 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Look up to me 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I submit to you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I don't hurt me again 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I'm a bad person 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I need help 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I need you to comfort me 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I want you to recognize me O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I'm glad I'm not you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Let's think about how guilty YOU feel one day after the statue was broken ... .In 
feeling this amount of guilt, what are YOU communicating? 
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Appendix F: 
Informed Consent Form 
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Page 1 of 2 
Date: 
Informed Consent 
Human Perceptions of Everyday Interactions 
Introduction/Purpose: Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson in the Department of Psychology at Utah State 
University is conducting a research study to find out more about people's perceptions of everyday 
events as well as their thoughts and emotional reactions to those events. You have been asked to 
take part because you are a student at Utah State University. Approximately 400 students will be 
invited to participate. 
Procedures: If you agree to participate in this study, you will be required to read a short story of 
less than 200 words. You will then be asked to complete a series of questionnaires that ask you 
about your memory of the events you have described and how you thought and felt. 
New Findings: During the course of this study, you will be informed of any significant new 
findings ( either good or bad,) such as changes in the risks or benefits resulting from participation in 
the research , or new alternatives to participation which might cause you to change your mind about 
continuing in the study, If new information is provided to you, your consent to continue 
participating in this study will be re-obtained. 
Risks: Some people may have experienced situations in their lives which they would rather not 
recall and may find the experience distressing . You may experience distress as a result of 
remembering an experience from your past. 
Benefits: There may or may not be any direct benefit to you from these procedures . A potential 
benefit to you is knowing that you are contributing to a scholarly investigation designed to increase 
our understanding of the way people think and feel in response to the actions of others. Another 
benefit to you is that you will receive extra class credit for your participation in this study. If you 
choose not to participate in this study, there are various other projects on which you may earn 
equivalent extra credit. 
Explanation & offer to answer questions: A research assistant has explained this study to you 
and answered your questions. If you have other questions or research-related problems, please 
contact Tamara J. Ferguson at (435) 797-3272 or Chris Treadwell at (435) 797-1460. 
Voluntary nature of participation and right to withdraw without consequence: Your decision 
to participate in this study is completely voluntary . You will receive class credit if you decide to 
participate . If you decide not to participate, you will not be penalized in any way. Participation in 
this project has no bearing on your grade in the class other than your receipt of extra credit. You 
may withdraw at anytime without consequence, other than you will not receive extra-credit points 
if you do not complete all study requirements. You may be withdrawn from this study without your 
consent by the investigator if you chose to not complete all participation requirements. 
Extra Costs: There will be no cost to you for participating. 
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Page 2 of 2 
Date: 
Confidentiality: Research records will be kept confidential consistent with federal and state 
regulations. Access to data collected during the course of this study will be limited to the Project 
Investigators and research assistants. Your completed consent form will be kept on file and will be 
checked against your completed packet of questionnaires to ensure that a signed consent form is 
obtained for each completed packet of questionnaires. Your student identification number is 
requested for purposes of communicating your student identification number to your instructor for 
recording of extra-credit points . No personal identifying information will be put on your 
questionnaires. All information that you provide for this study will be anonymous. Your name will 
not be requested on the questionnaires or be connected in any way with any of the data. Therefore , 
your anonymity will be fully protected . Data will be maintained indefinitely. 
IRB Approval Statement: The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human 
subjects at Utah State University has reviewed and approved this research project. 
Copy of consent: You have been given two copies of this Informed Consent. Please sign both 
copies and retain one copy for your files. 
Investigator Statement: "I certify that the research study has been explained to this participant , 
by me or my research staff, and that the individual understands the nature and purpose , the 
possible risks and benefits associated with taking part in this research study. Any questions that 
have been raised, have been answered ." 
Signature of PI & Student PI: 






If you feel fully informed about the study and are willing to participate , please complete the 
information requested below and return this form to the research assistant. The research assistant 
will provide you with your questionnaire packet. 
Your participation is ~ appreciated. 
Signature of Subject: 
(Your signature) Date 
Student Identification Number 
(must be provided to receive extra-credit) 
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Appendix G: 
Sample Time I and Time 2 Research Packets 
Sample Time 1 Research Packet 
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition: 
Human Perceptions of Every Day Interactions 
Phase 1 
(Form FPFl) 
Last six digits of student identification number: [ I I I I I I 
IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS!!! PLEASE READ CAREFULLY!!! 
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I. To participate in this study you must demonstrate your willingness to participate by 
reading and signing a statement of Informed Consent. A copy of the Informed Consent for 
this study should have been provided with this research packet. You may obtain a copy of 
the Informed Consent form from the research assistant. If you have not already done so, 
please take time to read and sign the Informed Consent before continuing to item 2 below. 
2. Your participation in this research effort has two parts. In Phase I, which takes place now, 
you are required to read some information and answer some questions. You will then be 
required to return to this room in approximately 24 hours for Phase 2 of your 
participation. When you return, you will be required to complete a second set of 
questionnaires . You should have already been scheduled for your return appointment. 
3. In order to prepare for your participation in Phase 2, please record the last six digits of 
your student identification number (or any other number) in the space at the top of this 
page. Now, locate the small colored sheet attached to this packet. Fill in the same six digit 
number in the space provided on the colored sheet. You will need to take this colored sheet 
with you when you leave today. Place the completed colored sheet in a safe place. This 
colored sheet will be your ticket to participate in the second phase of this study. When you 
return tomorrow to complete Phase 2, you will be required to present this colored sheet to 
receive the second set of questionnaires. Your identity will not be revealed. YOU MUST 
BRING TIDS COLORED SHEET WITH YOU TOMORROW TO RECEIVE 
EXTRA-CREDIT!!! 
4. After you have finished reading the instructions on this page, you will turn to the next page 
where you will find a brief statement followed by a short story. You are to carefully read 
the statement and the story that follows. Feel free to take whatever time you need to read 
and understand these items. 
5. When you have finished reading the story, tum to the next page and answer questions 1-
44. Please be sure to respond to ALL questions. 
6. When you have responded to all questions, please return these materials to the research 
assistant and confirm your appointment to return for Phase 2. 
7. Turn the page to begin Phase I. 
< <begin new page>> 
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INSTRUCTIONS: 
When you have read these instructions , please read the scenario that follows. 
While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to 
imagine that you are the person who hurts someone or someone ' s property. Try to 
imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say 
before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl 
into this person's "skin" as though you are actually acting out the entire event. 
Imagine that you are the person who hurt someone or damaged someone's 
property and really identify with being this person. 
STORY: 
YOU and Liz have been friends for many years . You spend several hours a week 
together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working 
at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. 
YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz 
walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million 
pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months 
meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse . Liz is in shock , staring 
at the remains of her spou se's gift. 
< <begin new pag e>> 
Part A 
For your convenience, the story you read earlier is_presented below. Please re-read the 
story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow. 
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YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together 
and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working _at the ceramics 
lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. 
Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips:-a:ro-pping her 
newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as tlie one 
LIZ has spent the _past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her 
spouse. LIZ is in sfiock, staring at the remains of her spouse's gift. 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED 
YOUR FRIEND'S STATUE. 
1. 
2. 
It is immediately _after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree did you 
believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided? 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
It is immediately after the statue was broken . Right then , to what degree did you 
believe the breaking of the statue was intentional? 
1 2 
I Not at all 
3 4 5 
I Somewhat 
6 7 
I Very much 
3. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, how justified did you feel 
in having broken the statue? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
Part B 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED 
YOUR FRIEND'S STATUE. 
Think back to the story you just read. Indicate the degree to which YOU are feeling each 
of the following emotions immediately after the statue was broken. Circle the numoe-r -
corresppnding to the degree YOU are experiencing_ each emotion . For example, if YOU 
are f~eling very ~dly angry, circle the number 1. -If YOU are not feeling a particular 










None Very Mildly 









O I 2 
O I 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 








































13. Let's think about how guilty YOU felt immediately after the statue was 
broken. Why is this your immediate feeling? 
< <begin new page>> 
Part C 
For your convenience, the story you read earlier is__presented below. Please re-read the 
story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow. 
YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week 
together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working 
at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning_ t1p and spill some water around the sink. 
YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz 
walks by_ and slips, dropJJing her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million 
pieces. YOU recogp.ize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months 
meticulously sculpting as an anajversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring 
at the remams ofher spouse's gift . 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED 

















Think back to the story you just read. Indicate the degree to which YOU were 
trying to communicate each of the following messages. Circle the number 
correspondin_g_ to the degree YOU wished to communicate each message. For 
examp1e, if YUU were communicating a very mild message ~respect me" to Liz, 
circle t~e number 1. If you think a specific message was not being communicated 
at all, circle zero. 
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then , I was communicating 
that... 
None Very Mildly Moderately Extremely 
6 ~ 2 3 h 5 6 ~ I deserve to be respected 
I care for~u 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I wish to forgiven 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I want to be treated better 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I'm better than you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am inadequate 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I don't want to be hurt 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Look up to me 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I subrrut to you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I don't want you to 
hurt me again 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I'm a bad person O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I need help O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I need you to comfort me O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I want )'.OU to recognize me O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I'm glac:l I'm not you O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Let~s think about how _guilty you felt immediately after the statue was broken ... .ln 
feeling this amount of rrnmediate guilt, what were you communicating? 
< <begin new page>> 
Part D 
For your convenience, the story you read earlier is_presented below. Please re-read the 
story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow. 
YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a 
week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day 
while workin_g at the ceramics lab YOU are cleaning up and §pill some 
water around-the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to 
step aw~ from th~ sµik, q.z .w~ and sJips, dropping her newly fired 
statue. The statue IS ma million pieces. YOU recogru.ze the statue as the 
one LIZ has S.Qent he past four months meticulously sculpting as an 
armiversary _gilt for her spouse. Liz is in shock, starmg at the remains of her 
spouse's giff. 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED 
YOUR FRIEND'S STATUE. 
Now that you have read the story and understand what you did and how 
you harmed someone, please thiiik about how LIZ, the person you have 
harmed thinks about what _you did. Try to really imagine how LIZ is 
responding to what you did and try to understand what she is thinking 
about your behavior:. Keeping LIZ's thoughts in mind, please respond to 
the next three uest1ons. 
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30. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Ri_ght then, to what degree does LIZ 
(not you) believe the breaking of the statue coulcl have been avoided? 
31. 
32. 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I 
Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ 
(not you) believe the breaking of the statue was intentional? 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I I I 
Not at all Somewhat Very much 
It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ 
(not you) believe you were justified in breaking the statue? 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I 
Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
Some Questions about You and the Story You Read 
Please answer the following questions. Circle the number that you believe is the best 
answer or respond in the space provided. 
30. Where did the event take place? 
a. in a movie theater 
b. ~t a grocery store. 
c. m a ceramics studio 
d. at a dinner party 
e. I don't remember 
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31. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 30 above. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all confident I Somewhat I Very confident 
32. Did the story describe how someone experienced harm? If yes, please elaborate 
what the story said about this: 
33. Did the story describe how the harm came about? If yes, please elaborate what the 
story said a6out this. 
34. What is your age? 
35. Are you male or female? (Circle one) 
< <begin new page>> 
36. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. 
What did "you" do in tfie story? 





5. I don t remember 
38. Outside of this particular incident, how much would you say that the two people 
generally like each other? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
39. What is your major? ----------------------
40. What is your occupation?--------------------
41. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. 
Who were you? 
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42. How suc<;essf\11 were you at putting yourself in the shoes of the person you were 
asked to 1dentifv with? 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I I I Not at all Somewhat to a great extent 





5. the time of day was not specified. 
44. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 43 above. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at ah confident I Somewhat I Very confident. 
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Human Perceptions of Every Day Interactions 
Phase 2 
(Form 1FPvF2) 
Last six digits of student identification number : 
L I I I I I I 
IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS!!! PLEASE READ CAREFULLY!!! 
Please record the last six digits of )'.our student identification number (the same six-
~igit p.um}?er you used yesterday!) in the space at the top of this page. Your 
identity will not be revealed . 
After you have finished reading the instructions on this pag_e,(ou will turn to the 
next page where you will find a brief review of the events lha transpired 
yesterday . 
When you have finished reading the review , turn to the next page and answer 
questions 1-4 7. Please be sure fo respond to ALL questions . 
When )'.OU h~ve responded to all questions , please return these materials to the 
research assistant. 
Tum the page to begin Phase 2. 
< <begin new page>> 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
Please read the following review 
Review: 
You were working in a ceramics lab with your friend , Liz . 
YOU noticed that you left water on the floor. Liz passed by, slipped on some 
water , and dropped her statue. Liz ' s statue was destroyed . 
< <begin new page>> 
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Part A 




It is one day after the statue was broken. Nowd to what degree did you believe the 
breaking of the statue could have been avoide ? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree did you believe the 
breaking of the statue was intentional? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
3. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now , how justified were you in breaking 
the statue? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
Part B 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ's STATUE WAS 
DESTROYED YESTERDAY. 
Indicate the degree to which YOU are feeling each of the following emotions one day 
after the statue was broken. Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU are 
experiencing each emotion. For example , if YOU are fee~g very mildly angry, circle the 
number I. ff YOU are not feeling a particular emotion at au, circle zero . 
None Very Mildly Moderately Extremely 
4. 
~gry 0 I 11 2 3 h 5 6 ~ 5. tty 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Guilt,: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Afraia 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Ashamed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Sad 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Hafil'y 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11. Em arrassed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Proud 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Let's think about how ~ilty YOU feel one day after the statue was broken. 
Why is this YOUR fee g now? 
< <begin new page>> 
Part C 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ's STATUE WAS 
DESTROYED YESTERDAY. 
If Liz happened to be with YOU today, what would YOUR feelinfls todfJ' be 
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commumcating? Circle the number correspondwo the degree YO wou be 
communicating each messa~. For example, ifY would oe communicating a very mild 
mes~e of"respect me" to iz, circle the number 1. If you think a specific message 
woul not be communicated at all, circle zero. 
It is one day after the statue was broken. If Liz happened to be with YOU , YOUR feelings 
would be communicating that.. . 
None Very Mildly Moderately Extremely 
14. I deserve to be respected 6 ~ 2 3 h 5 6 ~ 
15. I care for~u 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I wish to forgiven 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. I want to be treated better 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I'm better than you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. I am inadequate 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I don't want to be hurt 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Look ~f to me 0 1 2 .., 4 5 6 7 ., 
22. I subrru to you 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. I don ' t want you to 
hurt me again 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. I' m a bad person 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. I need help 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. I need you to comfort me O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. I want :xou to recognize me O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. I'm glaa I'm not you O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. Let's think about how guilty YOU feel one day after the statue was broken ... .In 
feeling this amount of guilt, what are YOU communicating? 
< <begin new page >> 
PartD 
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ'S STATUE WAS 
DESTROYED YESTERDAY. 
Think back to _yesterday and what you did to harm someone. Please think 
about how LIZ, the 12_erson you have harmed, thinks about what you did 
now, one day later. Try to really imagine how LIZ is responding to what 
you did yesterday and try to understand what she is thinking about your 
behavior nqw. Keeping LIZ's thoughts in mind, please respond to the next 
three uest10ns. 
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30. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does LIZ (not you) 
believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided'! 
31. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Jot at all 
I Somewhat I Very much 
It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does LIZ (not you) 
believe the breaking of the statue was intentional? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I 
Not at all 
I Somewhat I Very much 
32. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does LIZ (not you) 
believe you were justified in breaking the statue? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all I Somewhat I Very much 
Some Questions about You and the Story You Read 
Please answer the following questions. Circle the number that you believe is the best 
answer or respond in the space provided. 
33. Where did the event take place? 
a. in a movie theater 
b. ~t a grocery store. 
c. m a ceramics studio 
d. at a dinner party 
e. I don't remember 
34. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 33 above. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I Not at all confident I Somewhat I Very confident 
35. Did the story describe how someone experienced harm? If yes, please elaborate 
what the story said about this: 
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36. Did the story describe how the harm came about? If yes, please elaborate what the 
story said a6out this. 
<<begin new page >> 
37. What is your age? 
38. Are you male or female? (Circle one) 
39. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. 
What did ' 'you" do in tlie story? 





5. I don t remember 
41. Outside of this particular incident, how much would you say that the two people 
generally like each other? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I 
Not at all 
I 
Somewhat I Very much 
42 . What is your major? ------------
43 . What is your occupation? __________ _ 
44. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. 
Who were you? 
45. How suc<;essfi:11 were you at putting yourself in the shoes of the person you were 
asked to identify with? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I I I 
Not at all Somewhat to a great extent 





5. the time of day was not specified. 
47 . Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 43 above. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at ah confident I Somewhat I Very confident. 
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Appendix H: 
Research Packet Tracking Sheet 
Research Packet Tracking Sheet: 
Human Perceptions of 
Every Day Interactions 
Last six digits of student 
identification number: 
I I I I I I I 
BE SURE TO COME BACK TO 
THIS SAME ROOM, AG SCIENCE 
234 TOMORROW BETWEEN 
7:00 and 8:00 p.m . TO BE 
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Superv1Sor: Richard Isakson, Ph.D. , Psychologist and Training Director 
Therapist, University Counseling Center, Utah State University. 1998- 2000 
Duties: Clinical intakes; individual, couple, and group psychotherapy; crisis 
consultation; walk-in consultation; program outreach (depression 
screening, anxiety screening, eating disorders screening, communication 
workshops); and supervision of peer counselors. Half-time position. 
Supervisor: Mary E. Doty, Ph.D., Psychologist and Center Director 
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Psychological Assistant , Hillside Living Center, Logan, Utah. 1998-2000 
Duties: Psychological assessment of adult schizophrenic males; individual 
and group psychotherapy with adult schizophreruc males; development of 
behavioral mterventions , consultation with professional and non-
professional staff, and weekend on-call crisis/consultation coverage. Part-
time position . 
Supervisor: Kevin S. Masters , Ph.D ., Psychologist 
Psychometrician/Mental Health Specialist , Community-Family 
Partnership , Center for Persons with Disabilities, 
Utah State University. 
1997-1998 
Duties: Developmental assessment of low-SES children, individual 
psychotherapy provided in-home for fathers in low-SES families, program 
development to enhance fathers' participation in child rearin~ activities, 
program development to improve fathers' wage earning abilities. Half-time 
position. 
Supervisor: Patricia Truhn, Ph.D. , Psychologist and Director 
Therapist , University Counseling Center , Utah State University. 1997-1998 
Practicum position. 
Duties : Clinical intakes ; individual, couples , and group psychotherapy ; 
program outreach ( depression screening, anxiety screening, eating 
disorders screening, communication workshops) . 
Supervisor : David Bush, Ph.D., Training Coordinator 
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Instructor, Introduction to Psychology 101, Utah State University. Jan-May 1997 
Duties: Curriculum development , lectures , test preparation, grading, course 
administration , and supervision of undergraduate lab instructors. Half-time 
position. 
Supervisor: Tamara Ferguson, Ph.D. , Professor 
Psychological Assistant , Clinical Services, Center for Persons 1996- 1997 
with Disabilities, Utah State University . 
Practicum position . 
Duties: Clinical intake; psychological evaluation of developmental , 
learning, social and emotional disorders (particularly ADHD) in children 
and adolescents ; development of treatment interventions; individual 
psychotherapy; social skills groups for youth ages 8-14; and parenting skills 
workshops . 
Supervisor: Phyllis Cole, Ph.D., Psychologist and Director 
Graduate Teaching Assistant , Introduction to Psychology 101, 
Utah State University. 
1995-1997 
Duties: Course administration, test and quiz _preparation, grading, 
development of procedures and curriculum for weekly psychology labs for 
all students, lectures, and administration oflntemet-based psychology labs. 
Half-time position. 
Supervisor: Tamara Ferguson, Ph.D. , Professor 
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Duties: Clinical intakes , psychological evaluation of adults , and 
individual psychotherapy. 
Supervisor: Susan L. Crowley , Ph.D ., Director of Training 
Business Consultant , Customer Services Division, Novell , Inc. , 
Provo , Utah. 
1995 
Duties: Business planning support and organizational consultation to 
division executives. 
Vice-President, Strategic Planning , Worldwide Sales , Novell , Inc ., 1994 
Provo , Utah. 
Duties: Integration of international affiliate offices and business activities of 
WordPerfect Corporation and Novell , Inc. outside North America. Full-
tirne position . 
Supervisor : Joe Mareng~ Executive V.P ., Worldwide Sales 
Director, International , WordPerfect Corporation , Orem, Utah. 1984-1994 
Duties: Development of an internat ional distribution network. Recruitment 
and training of senior management outside the United States. Planning and 
organizational development for international affiliate offices . 
Administr ation of all mternational sales , marketing , and distribution 
activities. Responsibili ty for $200 million in annual revenues . Full-time 
position . 
Supervisor : Bruce Bastian, President ; John Lewis , Executive V.P. 
PROFESSIONAL WORKSHOPS & TRAINING 
Assessment and Treatment of Trauma. Presented by John Briere , Ph.D. April 4, 1997. 
Utah State Univers ity Counseling Center Conference. Logan , Utah. 
At-Risk Workshop: Assessing clients ' risk of harm to self and others. February 14, 1997 . 
Utah State Universit y. Logan , Utah. 
Couples: How and Why, Here and There. Presented by Donald Baucom, Ph.D. February 
22 and 23 , 2001. Brigham Young University Counseling Workshop. Provo , Utah. 
Existential Psychotherapy. Presented by Irvin Yalom, M.D. March 13, 1998. Utah State 
University Counseling Center Conference. Ogden , Utah. 
Treatment of Adults with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder : A Cognitive-Behavioral 
Approach. Presented by Donald Meichenbaum, Ph.D . April 28, 2000. Utah State 
University Counseling Center Conference. Logan, Utah . 
Treatment of Sexual Dysfunctions in Men and Women. Presented by Joseph Lo Piccolo, 
Ph.D. March 3, 1999. Utah State University Counseling Center Conference . Logan, 
Utah. 
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PRESENT A TIO NS 
Treadwell, C. L. & Ferguson, T. J. (1999, June). Variable relations between attribution 
and emotion: Comparing models of emotional arousal. Poster presentation. 
American Psychological Society, Eleventh Annual Convention . Denver , Colorado . 
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES 
Outreach Presentations 
Assertiveness Training. A two-hour discussion and experiential workshop on 
assertiveness presented to geriatric patients in a assisted living center. Logan , 
Utah. June 1999. 
Anger Management after Head Trauma. A two hour lecture and discussion on 
anger management for head-injured adults. Logan, Utah . October 1998. 
Guest Lectures & Training 
Classical and Operant Conditionin$. Presented to a Utah State University 
introductory psychology class. Bngham City, Utah . October 1999. 
Sensitivity to Boundary Issues. Presented to peer counselors at the Utah State 
University Counseling Center. Logan , Utah. October 1999. 
Effective Listening. Presented to academic tutors at Utah State University . 
Logan, Utah. November 1997 and November 1998. 
MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
American Psychological Association , Student Affiliate 
Association of Mormon Counselors and Psychotherapists , Student Affiliate 
